Carlos A. Ball - The Morality of Gay Rights: An Exploration in Political Philosophy

Published in 2003 by

Routledge

Taylor & Francis Group

711 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10017

Published in Great Britain by

Routledge

Taylor & Francis Group

2 Park Square, Milton Park

Abingdon, Oxon 0X14 4RN

Copyright 2003 by Taylor & Francis Books, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ball, Carlos A.

The morality of gay rights : an exploration in political philosophy / by Carlos A. Ball.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-415-93140-1 ISBN 0-415-93141-X (pbk.)

1. Gay rightsPhilosophy. 2. HomosexualityMoral and ethical aspects. I. Title.

HQ76.5 .B35 2002

305.90664dc21

2002069653

_____________

____

____

______

_____

_____

_____

T he writing of this book began with a single question: Does society have an obligation to recognize and support the relationships and families of lesbians and gay men? The question is an important one given that many of the reform efforts currently underway on behalf of lesbians and gay men, in both legislative and judicial arenas, revolve around it. As I began to think about the question, it seemed to me that some of the principles of political philosophy that for many years have provided the theoretical and justificatory framework for gay rights positions needed to be reconsidered. That framework has been based, in part, on the idea that the state should remain neutral regarding the morality of same-gender sexuality and relationships. The importance attached to neutrality is reflected in the often-heard demands by gay rights proponents that the state refrain from regulating the personal and sexual lives of lesbians and gay men. Paradoxically, however, many lesbians and gay men these days are asking that the state involve itself in their lives by recognizing and supporting their committed relationships and families.

This apparent inconsistency led me to consider whether gay rights supporters have to make specifically moral arguments (as opposed to neutral ones) in order to justify the kinds of state action that many are demanding. If we answer that question in the affirmative, as I believe we should, that raises a series of legitimate concerns about the advisability of incorporating notions of morality and the good into public policy matters associated with same-gender sexuality and relationships, when such notions have in the past contributed immensely to the oppression and marginalization of lesbians and gay men. This book primarily concerns itself with finding the appropriate balance between, on the one hand, incorporating notions of morality and the good into our understandings of the proper role of the state in the regulation of and support for intimate relationships (both sexual and familial) and, on the other hand, protecting the basic rights to autonomy and equality of all individuals, including those whose sexuality is different from the norm.

This book has also been motivated by an additional consideration, one that is less about political philosophy and more personal. Every gay or lesbian person experiences a dissonance between his or her sense of self-worth on the one hand and social norms that deem homosexuality to be intrinsically immoral and perverted on the other. Those of us with a same-gender sexual orientation know from the very core of our beings that our sexuality is neither immoral nor perverted. And yet, in important ways, prevailing liberal norms contribute to rather than mitigate the effects of the dissonance because they encourage us to sidestep rather than directly address the moral objections to our relationships and our lives raised by many opponents of gay rights. This book is, in part, my own (admittedly intellectual) way of quieting that dissonance.

I owe many thanks to individuals and institutions who helped me along the way, and without whose support and assistance this project would not have been possible. At the University of Illinois College of Law, where I work, I have been blessed with thoughtful colleagues and good friends. I thank, in particular, Ellen Deason, Kit Kinports, Andy Leipold, Phil McConnaughay, Janet Murphy, Jim Pfander, Laurie Reynolds, Steve Ross, Elaine Shoben, Nina Tarr, and Cindy Williams. The College of Law provided me with ongoing research support and a sabbatical during which I completed this manuscript. I was fortunate to be able to spend the sabbatical as a guest of the Texas Wesleyan University School of Law, where I was provided with office and library support. I thank both schools for their generosity. Jan Broekman, Don Dripps, David Meyer, David Richards, Mark Strasser, and Marlin Paschal read portions of the manuscript and provided wise and helpful comments. So did participants at law faculty workshops at Ohio State University, Texas Wesleyan University, the University of California at Los Angeles, and the University of Illinois. Andrew Koppelman deserves special mention because he was kind enough to read, in one form or another, almost the entire manuscript. Andy encouraged me to crystalize my ideas and to think about both their metaethical and practical implications; I am deeply indebted to him for that. Chai Feldblum also deserves special mention because she has been an enthusiastic reader and supporter from the beginning. Chai and I seem to be in a minority among academics who write in support of gay rights with our insistence that questions of morality and of gay rights are inextricably linked. It is a minority position that I am proud to share with her. Finally, the person to whom I owe the most is Richard Storrow, who has been a thoughtful reader, a kind friend, and a loving partner. Much of what I think I know about loving and caring for another human being, I have learned from him.

Some sections of appeared previously in Sexual Ethics and Postmodernism in Gay Rights Philosophy, 80 North Carolina Law Review 371 (2002), though I have made changes in organization and length, as well as some in style. I thank the journals for permitting the use of previously published material.