Johannes Wander - Mediation in the Conflict Resolution Process

Introductorily, the relevance of mediation will be emphasized, followed by an analysis how the theoretical challenges of the commitment and information problem are reduced by involving a third-party to mediate the conflict.

Wallensteen (2012) understands mediation as a step to negotiating a peace agreement: A third-party enters, acts, coordinates, and leaves the scene (p. 290). Unfortunately, this is only one particular scenario and mediation can include less ambitious attempts like lowering tensions or simply puting parties in a first contact as has been pointed out earlier. In another scenario mediators even have to stay after mediation is over in order to guarantee, implement, or oversee a situation if they promised to do so in the first place. Nevertheless, mediation is the first step on the rocky road towards a settlement and the only peaceful alternative to a (often bloody) victory of one side or a continuation of conflict. Deriving from this scenario, mediation is highly relevant and rightly claims our attention to be researched and considered in order to provide a reliable concept to approach conflicts of any kind.

In fact, Bercovitch (1996) found that two third of all post-Cold War conflicts were mediated compared to a phase between the second World War and 1990, where very few conflicts experienced mediation attempts. As a matter of fact, it is also important to emphasize that most mediation attempts fail in the end and do not provide us with a peace agreement or ceasefire (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p. 180). Furthermore, Bercovitch & Gartner (2008, p. 33) state that third-party mediated conflicts in the past were less likely to end up in a peace agreement compared to those cases, where parties negotiated directly with the each other, sparing a third-party. However, as Bercovitch & Gartner themselves point out, these findings are likely to be explained by selection bias: Incompatibilities addressed by mediators are likely to be more difficult, but therefore also more likely to fail than incompatibilities that can be addressed by the parties themselves. This leads to another important insight on the nature of mediation: It is often applied when other attempts already failed, opponents committed to fighting rather than talking, and the fronts are hardened.

Here mediation offers a solution by introducing a third-party, that can help to breakout an escalation spiral between two (more) parties (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p. 21). Presenting a mediating party to the adversaries allows those parties to overcome the commitment problem described by Powell (2006, p. 181). A mediator who enjoys trust of the parties can give credible guarantees to them that an agreed settlement will be implemented. Although either war party might question their counterparts commitment to peace, they can trust guarantees given by the mediator in case they are offered. On the contrary, research on the field of mediating international crises (Wilkenfeld, J., Young, K., Quinn, D. & Asal, V., 2005) states assumptions about mediation that raise doubt if the commitment problem can be overcome by mediation efforts. The authors claim that in order to distinguish a mediator from an arbitrator, mediation has to be non-binding, the mediator may leave the negotiations at any time, and cannot be expected to implement the agreement. These assumptions express the wish for the mediator to be independent from the parties and their incompatibilities. However, this does not necessarily forbid the mediator to make commitments if she wishes to do so in order to gain the parties trust. As Walter (2012, p. 79) found, peace settlement are more likely to be agreed and implemented by the parties if third-party guarantees are given. This leads to the conclusion that a mediator has to balance between acting independent and offering to support belligerents in implementing a peace agreement.