The Future of the Soviet Navy
Westview Special Studies
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About the Book and Editors
The efforts of the Soviet Union since the mid-1950s to develop naval power have produced one of the strongest navies in the world, but this achievement has not been without serious costs. The construction of increasingly complex submarines, ships, and aircraft has required greater investment of resources and manpower. This volume addresses whether the Soviet Union will continue naval expansion and what directions technological development will take in the future. In particular, the contributors consider trends in submarine, aircraft carrier, and surface combatant systems and examine what implications these developments have for U.S. defense planning over the next two decades.
Naval Commander Bruae W. Watson, director of publications at the Defense Intelligence College, is the author of Red Navy at Sea (Westview, 1982) and The Soviet Navy (Westview, 1986). ColonelPeter M. Dunn, foremerly assistant provost for research at the Defense Intelligence College, is commander of the U.S. Air Force ROTC detachment at the University of Missouri. He is the coeditor (with Bruce W. Watson) of The Military Lessons of the FalklandIslands War (Westview, 1984) and of American Intervention in Grenada (Westview, 1985).
First published 1986 by Westview Press
Published 2019 by Routledge
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Copyright 1986 Taylor & Francis
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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 85-52192
ISBN 13: 978-0-367-29239-3 (hbk)
To
Bruce, Susan,
Jennifer, and Ella Watson
Contents
by John Jordan
by Norman Friedman
by Norman Polmar
by Arthur D. Baker III
by Frank Uhlig, Jr.
by Jan S. Breemer
by Bruce W. Watson
The appointment of Sergei G. Gorshkov as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy on the eve of the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 signalled the Soviet Unions Intention to stress naval development. Such subsequent development has been Impressive and has brought the Soviet Navy from little more than a coastal defense force to the force of today, which is one of the two strongest navies In the world and which operates on all the worlds major oceans.
This effort has certainly not been without its costs. Soviet naval construction is both dynamic and pedestrian, dynamic to the extent that when the Soviets realized that they had produced a system (such as the Moskva -class helicopter carriers) that did not meet mission specifications they discontinued and moved on, and pedestrian because technological innovation between one system and the next is generally much less than that between Western systems. The result has been a continuous stream of submarines, ships, and aircraft.
But will the Soviets continue this emphasis on naval construction, and if so, in what directions will they proceed? The current program is costly in terms of resources and manpower and to think that the Soviets will unconsciously continue such a program is simplistic. Conversely, the Soviets have gained much through naval expansion, and this will support those who argue for continued expansion in the future. Certainly as the Soviet submarines, ships, and aircraft have become more complex they have become more costly to produce, and this trend will continue into the future. This implies that some difficult decisions will have to be made. What does this mean for the Soviet Navy and, more specifically, what types of systems are they most likely to produce?
The answers to these questions are crucial for U.S. defense planners. The editors have been extremely fortunate to have convinced some of the best naval commentators to consider these questions. In the following chapters they present their views concerning the most likely future trends in Soviet naval construction. John Jordan opens the study with an incisive discussion of future Soviet submarine trends. Norman Friedman then examines Soviet aircraft carriers and reveals some interesting problems that the Soviets must face if they are to use their carriers effectively. Norman Polmar then looks at Soviet major surface combatant construction and sees this as the fragile part of Soviet naval construction. If his hypothesis is correct, it has great significance for U.S. defense planning. Arthur D. Baker III then provides a seminal study on small Soviet naval combatants, which reveals interesting trends in several areas. (Mr. Baker also graciously provided the table and appendices to this work.) We continue with a noteworthy amphibious study by Frank Uhlig, which, if correct, has great implications for the United States, NATO, Japan, and Korea. Jan Breemer then provides a masterful estimate of future events in Soviet mine warfare. The study concludes with an examination of current Soviet naval strategy which may indicate how the Soviets intend to use these systems of the future.
