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Paul G. Mahoney - Wasting a Crisis: Why Securities Regulation Fails

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Paul G. Mahoney Wasting a Crisis: Why Securities Regulation Fails
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The recent financial crisis led to sweeping reforms that inspired countless references to the financial reforms of the New Deal. Comparable to the reforms of the New Deal in both scope and scale, the 2,300-page Dodd-Frank Act of 2010the main regulatory reform package introduced in the United Statesalso shared with New Deal reforms the assumption that the underlying cause of the crisis was misbehavior by securities market participants, exacerbated by lax regulatory oversight.
With Wasting a Crisis, Paul G. Mahoney offers persuasive research to show that this now almost universally accepted narrative of market failurebroadly similar across financial crisesis formulated by political actors hoping to deflect blame from prior policy errors. Drawing on a cache of data, from congressional investigations, litigation, regulatory reports, and filings to stock quotes from the 1920s and 30s, Mahoney moves beyond the received wisdom about the financial reforms of the New Deal, showing that lax regulation was not a substantial cause of the financial problems of the Great Depression. As new regulations were formed around this narrative of market failure, not only were the majority largely ineffective, they were also often counterproductive, consolidating market share in the hands of leading financial firms. An overview of twenty-first-century securities reforms from the same analytic perspective, including Dodd-Frank and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, shows a similar pattern and suggests that they too may offer little benefit to investors and some measurable harm.

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Wasting a Crisis
Wasting a Crisis
Why Securities Regulation Fails

PAUL G. MAHONEY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

CHICAGO AND LONDON

PAUL G. MAHONEY is dean of the University of Virginia School of Law, where he is also the David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law and the Arnold H. Leon Professor of Law.

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London

2015 by The University of Chicago

All rights reserved. Published 2015.

Printed in the United States of America

24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 1 2 3 4 5

ISBN -13: 978-0-226-23651-3 (cloth)

ISBN -13: 978-0-226-23665-0 (e-book)

DOI : 10.7208/chicago/9780226236650.001.0001

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Mahoney, Paul G. (Paul Gerard), 1959 author.

Wasting a crisis : why securities regulation fails / Paul G. Mahoney.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-226-23651-3 (cloth : alkaline paper) ISBN 978-0-226-23665-0 (e-book) 1. Securities industryLaw and legislationUnited States. 2. Securities industryLaw and legislationUnited StatesHistory20th century. I. Title.

KF 1070. M 34 2015

346.73'0926dc23

2014031054

This paper meets the requirements of ANSI / NISO Z 39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

TO MY PARENTS, MARY AND BERTRAND MAHONEY;

MY UNCLE, JOHN L. GUBSER;

AND MY GRANDMOTHER, THE LATE MRS. JOHN H. GUBSER

Contents

Acknowledgments

I owe many intellectual debts. George Priest first exposed me to law and economics as a student during the early 1980s, a time of great ferment in the field, and encouraged me to think about an academic career. I had the extraordinary privilege of clerking for Judge Ralph Winter, one of the pioneers of the economic analysis of corporate law. Ralphs example and our many deeply substantive conversations convinced me to focus on corporate and securities law. He is everything one could ask for in a teacher, employer, friend, mentor, and role model.

Also in the early 1980s, Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel wrote a series of articles that set the agenda for corporate and securities law scholarship for that decade and beyond. Those articles formed the basis for their book The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991), published just as I began my academic career. At about the same time, Roberta Romano pioneered the use of empirical methods in the legal literature on corporate and securities law, bringing legal scholars into conversations that had previously taken place almost exclusively among financial economists. These three scholars had a deep influence on my own agenda and methodology. Ive been fortunate to get to know each, and each commented on parts of this book. Roberta read the entire manuscript and has my particular thanks.

Parts of , Guolin Jiang. These chapters contain what I regard as some of the most important empirical results in the book. Jianping and Guolin deserve an equal part of any credit that is due. Im grateful to them for allowing me to include our joint work here.

Ive been fortunate to have an extraordinarily supportive and intellectually demanding group of colleagues at the University of Virginia, where Ive spent my entire academic career. Countless conversations with current and former corporate and securities law colleagues Barry Adler, Ian Ayres, Michal Barzuza, Albert Choi, Quinn Curtis, Mike Dooley, George Geis, John Harrison, Ed Kitch, Kevin Kordana, Saul Levmore, John Morley, George Triantis, and Andy Vollmer shaped the ideas contained in the book, and most of them commented extensively on one or more parts of it. My three most recent predecessors as dean, Tom Jackson, Bob Scott, and John Jeffries, were unfailingly helpful and encouraging.

Colleagues from other disciplines, some within the Law School and many in other parts of the University of Virginia, helped me anticipate substantive or methodological criticisms from their fields. Historians Barry Cushman, Chuck McCurdy, and Ted White, economists Yiorgos Allayannis, Bob Bruner, Robert Conroy, Ken Eades, Leora Friedberg, Bob Harris, and John James, and John OBrien, an expert in eighteenth-century British literature, all gave generously of their time.

The University of Virginia Law Library was a partner throughout, doggedly tracking down sources and in general upholding its reputation as the best law school library in the nation. Special thanks go to Cathy Palombi, who spent many hours on the telephone persuading other libraries to lend us archival material and carefully tending it while in our custody, and to Kent Olson, who helped me navigate the early twentieth-century financial press.

An army of research assistants worked on the various parts of the book, often meticulously entering or verifying data from microfilmed newspapers or, in more recent years, from online archives. They also carefully read contemporary accounts of market, legislative, and regulatory developments. Im very grateful to Kelly Baker, Daniel Barden, Travis Batty, Julie Bentz, Katherine Beury, Lindsay Bird, Nick Bluhm, Federico Botta, Rebecca Brown, Andrew Brownstein, Theresa Clark, Adrienne Davis, Ryan Davis, Matt Einbinder, Padraic Fennelly, Will Gould, Sangyean Hwang, Kelly King, David Luce, Matt Middleton, Jennifer Mink, Noah Mink, Kimberly Paschall, Thomas Pearce, Anna Shearer, Kris Shepard, Angela Sinkovits, and Jacky Werman for all their help.

I received incisive and helpful comments on parts of the book from Franklin Allen, George Benston, Mary Anne Case, Jill Fisch, Stuart Gilson, Bruce Johnsen, Reinier Kraakman, Randall Kroszner, Ed McCaffery, Alan Meese, Geoff Miller, Eric Orts, Eric Posner, Bill Schwert, Andrei Shleifer, Jeff Strnad, Steve Thel, Bill Williams, Guojun Wu, Chunsheng Zhou, and several anonymous referees. Mark Weinstein went far beyond the call of duty, not only commenting extensively on the chapter relating to market manipulation in the 1920s, but spending many hours helping me think through the data and methodological challenges that the work raised. The individual chapters also benefited greatly from comments received at workshops and seminars at the law and/or business schools at the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Chicago, George Mason University, Harvard University, New York University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Southern California, Stanford University, the University of Toronto, Vanderbilt University, the College of William & Mary, and Yale University, and the economic history seminar at the University of Virginia.

My editors at the University of Chicago Press made a new experience entirely enjoyable. Im very grateful to Chris Rhodes and Jillian Tsui for their advice, encouragement, and assistance.

My greatest debt is to my colleague and spouse, Julia Mahoney, who read the manuscript in multiple incarnations and provided patient guidance throughout.

The 20078 financial crisis and its aftermath inspired countless references to the Great Depression, the New Deal financial reforms, and the collapse in equity prices of 192932. News coverage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 routinely referred to it as the most sweeping financial reform since the Great Depression.

Dodd-Frank was as extensive and complex as the entire package of New Deal financial reforms, so in that sense the analogy is appropriate. But the references to the New Deal financial reforms were also intended to suggest that both addressed a common set of underlying problems. Many analysts argue that misbehavior by financial market participants was a strong underlying cause of both financial crises, that lax regulatory oversight facilitated the misbehavior, and that new regulations adopted after the crisis made a repetition of the problems less likely. Throughout this book, I refer to a description of a financial crisis incorporating these three claims as a market failure narrative.

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