Rodgers Russ - The generalship of Muhammad: battles and campaigns of the Prophet of Allah

UNIVERSITY PRESS OF FLORIDA

Florida A&M University, Tallahassee

Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton

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University of West Florida, Pensacola

MUHAMMAD

Battles and Campaigns of the Prophet of Allah

RUSS RODGERS

Copyright 2012 by Russ Rodgers

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America on recycled, acid-free paper

17 16 15 14 13 12 6 5 4 3 2 1

All maps by Russ Rodgers

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Rodgers, Russ

The generalship of Muhammad : battles and campaigns of the Prophet of Allah / Russ Rodgers.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8130-3766-0 (alk. paper)

1. Muhammad, Prophet, d. 632Military leadership. I. Title.

BP77.7.R64 2012

297.6'3dc23

2011037547

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To my wife and daughter, who continue to teach me joy and gratitude.

It is necessary to provide you, the reader, with an idea about the scope and nature of this military analysis of the campaigns of Muhammad, along with a few of the important specialized terms and the types of sources used. In the modern world of military historical literature there are a number of terms used to describe how weaker movements engage and defeat stronger opponents. Today such terms as insurgency, asymmetric warfare, and irregular warfare are commonly used to explain such movements, and yet these terms were unknown to military thinkers until most recent times. When one speaks of insurgency today, they typically refer to a weaker group that uses methods of warfare often cited as irregular, unconventional, or asymmetric, and that strives to overcome what is considered an established government or organization. But even such a definition raises the question of what irregular, unconventional, or asymmetric warfare is. Such terminology can actually engender confusion among readers and military practitioners alike.

For the purposes of this work, irregular or unconventional warfare refer to organizational methods that eschew clear and deliberate organization and operations, especially one that clearly defines the differences between combatants and civilians. But more importantly, terms such as insurgency or asymmetric warfare highlight a difference in actual tactics and operational techniques used by a particular movement. Therefore, irregular warfare should not be confused with insurgency, or unconventional warfare confused with asymmetric warfare. So what do these terms actually mean, and what is the best way to define them?

In the context of the modern world, insurgency refers to any movement bent on overthrowing an established government or organization. With this said, we must next understand the difference between a symmetric and an asymmetric insurgency. While it is fashionable for some to think that insurgency and asymmetric warfare are the same thing, to do so does violence to the strict definition of the word asymmetric. Symmetric or asymmetric refer simply to methods. To be symmetric simply means to use methods nearly identical to ones enemies, while to be asymmetric would be to move outside an enemys realm of experience. In this manner we can see that anyone in history can engage in both, perhaps even simultaneously, while also engaging in insurgency or conventional military operations. However, such a definition did not exist in the ancient world, and certainly not in the world of Muhammads seventh-century Arabia. Therefore, for the sake of this study, these terms have been superimposed over the historical activities of Muhammad and his companions to help us understand how he campaigned and won. Therefore, to clarify, an insurgency is a movement to overthrow an existing or established government or organization while asymmetric or symmetric warfare are merely techniques to achieve this end.

With this in mind, it can be seen that any form of warfare can be asymmetric or symmetric. During World War II, Germany used an asymmetric doctrinal approach of mobile warfare to defeat France in 1940, the latter organizing its defense around the idea of positional military thought. Popularly known as the blitzkrieg, or lightning war, the Germans were able to overrun France and defeat an army that was larger and better equipped than their own. By using an asymmetric approach, they were able to defeat a doctrinally ill-prepared opponent. In contrast, the Allies largely used a symmetric approach to defeat Germany three years later. Allied forces mirrored the German army in almost every aspect, and defeated them by often overwhelming them with material superiority. By the time the Allies reached the western border of Germany, the war devolved into an attritional contest as the forces slugged it out for months along the German frontier.

While few would argue against the idea that conventional warfare can be symmetric or asymmetric, it becomes more controversial when discussing insurgency. Once the shooting starts, insurgencies are typically asymmetric, but this is more out of necessity than a matter of choosing the best technique to achieve victory. If given a choice and the resources necessary, almost any leader in history would chose to achieve victory more quickly through conventional means than to opt for the drawn-out lengthy conflict called insurgency or guerrilla warfare. Insurgencies cannot face an established government on equal terms, or, put another way, symmetrically. This is the portion of insurgency that most see and that is written about in the popular texts of today.

But what is typically missed is that insurgencies are far more about philosophical and worldview transformation than about ambushing government forces from a jungle or mountain sanctuary. The initial phase of an insurgency strives to alter the mind of people, particularly key leaders, to support a new worldview that is in contrast to their established one. Indeed, this is arguably the most important aspect of any insurgency, and it is almost exclusively symmetric, apart from the differences in the worldviews. Once the fighting begins, much of an insurgency movement has already passed by the snoozing leaders of a targeted culture. In this way, the insurgency moves from a symmetric to an asymmetric approach in order to build the force necessary to push a sleepy majority of a culture into succumbing to the insurgencys demands. Once having achieved the level of force necessary, the insurgency transforms once again from an asymmetric to a symmetric approach to bring about the final triumph. When looking at insurgency from this perspective, one can see that the dictum of Carl von Clausewitz that war is the extension of politics by other means can be flipped to its inverse, that politics is an extension of war by other means. Insurgency starts in the realm of philosophy and ideology to lay the foundation and is followed by the physical violence necessary to impose its principles on a culture that otherwise would not have accepted such views.