Shreya Atrey - Intersectional Discrimination

SHREYA ATREY

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Shreya Atrey 2019

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First Edition published in 2019

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Library of Congress Control Number: 2019945374

ISBN 9780198848950

eISBN 9780192588838

Intersectional Discrimination. Shreya Atrey,

Oxford University Press (2019). Shreya Atrey

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198848950.001.0001

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To my mother, for her radical moral courage;

and to my father, for being the ultimate feminist

I owe the greatest debt to Sandra Fredman for being my guru and intellectual guide for this project. Gautam Bhatia, Miles Jackson, Alison Pryce, and Raphale Xenedis have been generous readers of significant parts of the book. Mark Bell, Meghan Campbell, Chris McConnachie, Michael Ford, Beth Gaze, Denise Raume, Nazila Ghanea, Laura Hilly, Tarunabh Khaitan, Fiona de Londras, and Kate ORegan have provided valuable input at various stages of this project. Alan Bogg, David Oppenheimer, and Tonia Novitz have been greatly supportive and enthusiastic in seeing this book through. The painstaking comments of two anonymous reviewers proved extremely useful in getting the book together. The Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law at the Melbourne Law School provided a welcoming community and comfortable space for writing the final parts of the book. Members of the Berkeley Comparative Equality and Anti-Discrimination Law Study Group have done the same over many years.

My parents, Archana and Pradeep, have enabled my work by providing the necessary distance from it, through quality breaks and reminders to stay grounded. My sister, Vartika, and brother-in-law, Rohit, have managed a robust system of long-distance care for me. My partner, Felix, has been an exceptional sparring partner for critical thoughts explored in this book, in addition to offering unimaginable love and sustenance.

My heartfelt thanks to all.

Peel Law Association and Melissa Firth v Selwyn Pieters and Brian Noble 2013 ONCA 396

Constitution of India 1950

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1997

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Interim) 1993

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982

Equality Act 2010

Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against

discrimination. Articles, even books, have been spent in finding ways of translating intersectionality theory into the precincts of discrimination law practice. Despite this, the framework of discrimination law has proven to be too resistant to have been able to transform the will to address intersectionality into a way of redressing it in discrimination law. Thus, the project of transforming the will into a way may be reimagined as the project of transforming discrimination law per se. Instead of having intersectionality awkwardly fit the single-axis model, discrimination law could be re-centred around intersectionality. If so, then how should non-discrimination guarantees be articulated and interpreted? Who should they protect? How should discrimination be defined? How should it be proven? Which remedies should be ordered? In other words, how can discrimination law practice be reimagined to realize intersectionality?