Major John R. Carter - Airpower And The Cult Of The Offensive

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Text originally published in 1998 under the same title.

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AIRPOWER AND THE CULT OF THE OFFENSIVE

by

John R. Carter, Jr.

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER

Maj John R. Carter, Jr. (BS, Duke University; MAS Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University) was most recently an A-10 pilot. A distinguished graduate of the Reserve Officer Training Corps program, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Force in May 1982. After completing undergraduate pilot training at Laughlin AFB, Texas, he was assigned to Shaw AFB, South Carolina as an O-2 pilot and forward air controller. In 1986 Major Carter was reassigned to the 354 Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina as an A-10 pilot. He graduated from the USAF Fighter Weapons School in 1990 and returned to the 354 TFW as a squadron weapons officer. After deploying to Operation Desert Shield, he was reassigned to the 10 TFW, RAF Alconbury, UK. He returned to Operation Desert Shield as his squadrons weapons officer and subsequently led 41 combat missions during Operation Desert Storm. He was assigned to Nellis AFB, Nevada in 1991 as an instructor pilot in the A-10 Division of the USAF Weapons School, where he completed his tour in 1995 as the operations officer to attend Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Upon graduation from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, he will be reassigned to Headquarters, Air Combat Command at Langley AFB, Virginia. A senior pilot with 2,700 hours in O-2 and A-10 aircraft, Maj Carter was the recipient of the Robbie Risner Award as the USAF Weapon Schools outstanding graduate of 1990. He is married to the former Melissa Kline and they have two children, Robert and Hannah.

I would like to thank Dr. Jim Corum for his critical comments and his pointers to original sources which added meat to a sometimes skeletal argument. I also want to thank Maj Mark Conversino and Dr. David Mets for their helpful comments.

I especially want to thank Dr. Karl Mueller. First, for sparking the original research question with his engaging presentation of international relations theory during the SAAS course. Second, for his frequent suggestions, feedback, and insights which assisted me tremendously in developing this study.

A special heart-felt thanks to my wife, Melissa, and to Robert and Hannah for their understanding, encouragement, sacrifices, and assistance during the completion of this task.

The belief that airpower is inherently offensive is a recurrent theme throughout airpower theory and doctrine. Before World War I, dogmatic belief in the dominance of the offense in land warfare affected the military decisions which resulted in the disaster of the trenches. Termed the cult of the offensive by scholars, faith in offense became so unshakable in pre-1914 Europe that military organizations dismissed as irrelevant the numerous indications of the waning power of the offense as technological developments strengthened the defense. With airpowers professed inclination for offense, could a cult of the offensive perniciously trap airpower doctrine and lead to similarly disastrous consequences?

The study begins by establishing the theoretical background necessary for case study analysis. Airpower defense is defined as those operations conducted to deny another forces air operations in a designated airspace. Airpower offenses are those operations in the airspace defended by another, or operations conducted outside of one's actively defended airspace. The relationship between offense and defense is dissected to discover that airpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position nor of time, so traditional Clausewitzian views relative to the power of the defense do not apply to airpower. Next, the study describes those factors which may inject, or reinforce, a preferential bias for offense into airpower strategy and doctrine. A cult of the offensive is defined as an organizational belief in the power of offense so compelling that the military organization no longer evaluates its offensive doctrine objectively. This leads to an examination of the ramifications postulated to result from offensive ideology.

Three cases are explored to determine if the cult of the offensive applies to air forces: the doctrine of the British Royal Air Force from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Forces strategy from 1967 to 1973, and the United States Air Forces nuclear strategy from 1953 to 1965. The study concludes that cults of the offensive have indeed influenced airpower doctrine in the past, and that detailed offensive planning and critical capabilities evaluation provide two methods of avoiding this potential trap.

I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong.... Still it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.Michael Howard, Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Lecture, 3 October 1973

Since a complete understanding of the conditions of future conflict lies beyond the horizon of any strategist, those called upon in the future to execute doctrine formulated today will likely find it lacking. The degree to which doctrine fails to anticipate the actual conditions of combat may spell the difference between victory and defeat. That military organizations entrusted with the preservation of national security will strive to develop usable doctrine appears self-evident, as does the assertion that future conflict will hold some surprises despite the best efforts of planners, especially if a nation enters an unexpected conflict. What is surprising, however, is that doctrine sometimes turns out to be thoroughly inappropriate for even an anticipated, foreseen conflict. Obviously no organization sets out to develop a flawed doctrine, but despite the best of intentions, some doctrines lead to tragedy for the armed forces employing them. To help avert such future tragedies, this paper offers insights about how to avoid one possible cause of badly wrong doctrine.

The military doctrines of the European powers in 1914 erred terribly by underestimating the power of the defense. Several authors, notably Stephen Van Evera and Jack Snyder, have examined the antebellum characteristics of the major European powers World War I military organizations and label the myriad causes and effects of their extreme faith in offense over defense in spite of contrary evidence the cult (or ideology) of the offensive. {1} The experience of World War I appears to demonstrate that one way to get doctrine badly wrong is to overestimate the power of the offense.