Azar Gat - War and Strategy in the Modern World

First published 2018

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2018 Azar Gat

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ISBN: 978-1-138-63256-1 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-20815-2 (ebk)

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This volume brings together a select collection of my articles on the evolution of strategic doctrines and the transformation of war during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The articles are arranged in chronological order: the volume begins with the rise of the German Panzer arm and the doctrine of Blitzkrieg during the interwar period; it ends with the spread of peace in the developed world, threatened as it is by the challenge posed by the authoritarian-capitalist great powers China and Russia and by the chilling prospect of unconventional terrorism. The sequence of the articles also reflects the development of my interests and scholarly pursuits, starting with my books on the evolution of military theory and doctrine, assembled in the omnibus edition A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (2000). My interests later expanded to broader questions relating to war, pursued in my War in Human Civilization (2006), Victorious and Vulnerable: Why Democracy Won in the 20th Century and How It is still Imperiled (2010), and The Causes of War and the Spread of Peace: But Will War Rebound? (2017).

In revising these articles for publication, I have tried not to make changes that would reflect the benefit of hindsight. Indeed, I have been satisfied to see that the articles have well withstood the test of time. Choosing to leave them basically in their original form has also meant that later publications on their respective subjects have not been included either. I do not find that they significantly alter my conclusions. Most of the changes I have introduced are cuts made to avoid repetitions and overlaps between the articles. I have also made occasional stylistic changes.

Misconceptions regarding the rise of the Panzer arm which gave Germany its lightning victories at the beginning of World War II are, surprisingly, very signifi-cant indeed. British Influence, the Evolution of the Panzer Arm, and the Rise of Blitzkrieg sets out to correct some of these major misconceptions. Revelations that the famous British military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart manipulated the German generals testimonies after World War II have discredited the claim of a decisive British influence on the evolution of the German Panzer arm during the 1920s and 1930s. However, the German archives from that period reveal that this influence was indeed paramount. The article also shows that fateful historical accidents, unnoticed by scholars, were largely responsible for the fact that the Panzer arm did not follow the mistaken routes taken by the other great powers with respect to the organization of armour. Finally, the article shows that, rather than being a formal doctrine formulated by the German armed forces during the 1930s, Blitzkrieg emerged as an operational concept only during the early campaigns of World War II, while the word itself was sensationally coined by the foreign press.

In the wake of World War II, the controversies of the interwar period regarding both national policy and strategic doctrine were dramatically viewed as struggles between prescience and folly. This narrative continues to dominate the popular view and the media. However, from the late 1960s, as national archives opened, scholars have been formulating a more complex and nuanced picture, in which right and wrong have not been as starkly contrasted as before. In Technology, National Policy, Ideology, and Strategic Doctrine between the World Wars, I outline the real dilemmas, deep constraints, genuine uncertainties, and conflicting goals which haunted governments and military establishments during the 1930s.