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SPARKS OVER VIETNAM
THE EB-66 AND THE EARLY STRUGGLE OF TACTICAL ELECTRONIC WARFARE
BY
CAPTAIN GILLES VAN NEDERVEEN, USAF
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER
Executive Summary
Technology has often been a key component in turning the tide of battle, particularly so in modern air wars. From the Battle of Britain to the Bekaa Valley to the most recent air operations against Iraq and Serbia, an invisible but vital duel was waged for control of the electromagnetic spectrum, with victory going to the side best prepared to exploit it while at the same time denying its effective use to the enemy. Both the Gulf War and the Air War Over Serbia illustrated the vital role of airborne electronic warfare, rekindling concerns for effective electronic systems, techniques, doctrine, and platforms. Contrary to many peoples impressions, stealth technology has not negated the need for electronic jamming. Rather it has increased both the desirability of and potential benefits for judicious disruption of enemy electronic defense networks.
This study underscores the important use of electronic intelligence and jamming as an electronic countermeasure. Three decades ago, the USAF faced a North Vietnamese electronic air defense threat about which little was known. Through some extraordinary efforts, the USAF ably countered that threat employing an obsolete aircraft, the EB-66, only refitted and upgraded for mid 1960s missions. Since the aircraft was at the end of its projected lifecycle, and a new jammer was on the drawing board, the air staff would not fund additional EB-66 modifications and maintenance requirements. Parallels are easy to draw with todays jammers, as essentially the same situation exists with the EA-6B.
The number of EB-66 aircraft during the Vietnam War was inadequate to meet both operational and training requirements. Thus, crews were trained on the job, often during combat operations, and the boneyard at Davis-Monthan was often the site of scavenger hunts for repair parts needed to keep the aircraft aloft. The advent of the Pueblo crisis created an additional demand for the EB-66 forcing a partial redeployment of the fleet from Thailand to Korea. Training assets were also flown from Shaw to Germany during the same period to monitor the escalating air defense threat in the Warsaw Pact nations. Missions and employment doctrine had to change to match electronic counters by adversaries from all directions.
It became evident to all Air Force leaders that the requirement for airborne electronic warfare surpassed capability. The situation exists still, witness the open-ended commitment of EA-6Bs in support of the Northern and Southern Watch No-Fly Zones as well as in the Balkans and Korea. The ability of the existing EA-6B forces to support additional contingency operations is questionable at best. What is clearly evident is that without an effective means to gather electronic threat data and to conduct jamming operations in order to suppress enemy air defense capability, American strike aircraft will be endangered. Therefore, it is imperative that DOD invest in new technologies and improved airframes to maintain technical superiority in both ELINT and ECM operations. Without doing so, airmen will be forced to relearn the lessons that should have been learned with the story of the EB-66.
DEDICATION
This book is dedicated to the crews of the EB-66.
An EB-66C crew (pilot, navigator, gunner, and four electronic warfare officers) at Yokota AB, Japan in the late fifties. Crew and aircraft assigned to the 11 th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron.
Foreword
Captain Van Nederveens paper can truly be a one source document describing the trials and tribulations of procuring and employing one of the Air Forces first unique aircraft during peace, war, and military operations other than war (MOOTW). The EB-66C and the Early Struggle of Tactical Electronic Warfare is an excellent read; methodical, historical, and reminiscent of a true workhorse in the United States Air Force. It is short enough to read in a few short sittings. The lessons learned are immediately apparent and applicable in todays declining budgets. Read this paper for its intellectual content, educational value, or for pure enjoyment.
Major-General Glen D. Shaffer, USAF
Director of Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
DCS, Air and Space Operations
1. Introduction
The EB-66B/C/E aircraft flew Air Force tactical electronic warfare missions from 1956 until 1974. These aircraft were derived from the B-66 Destroyer that had been developed as a tactical bomber, itself a modified version of the Navy attack bomber, the A3D Skywarrior. During early development work on the Air Force B-66, the Korean War requirement for a reconnaissance platform delayed development of the bomber variant. The Air Force leaders recognized that they needed a quick replacement of their obsolete reconnaissance aircraft, the RB-26, in Tactical Air Command (TAC). The first prototype of the B-66 was thus not a bomber, but a reconnaissance aircraft designated RB-66A (see chart on page 3).
The five prototype models, the RB-66As, exhibited some severe flight handling difficulties. Once those were corrected, beginning in 1954, Douglas Aircraft in Tulsa, Oklahoma simultaneously built the B-66 bomber and RB-66B photo-reconnaissance airframes. Later when TAC also required specialized intelligence collectors it again choose the B-66 airframe to meet these needs. Between 1955 and 1957 the Air Force bought thirty-six tactical electronic reconnaissance versions, the RB-66C, and thirty-six WB-66D weather reconnaissance aircraft. These were the last B-66 airframes off the production line in 1958. These last two variants, the RB-66C and WB-66D had a modified bomb-bay that housed aircrew members and electronic equipment.
In the early fifties TAC had been forced to rely on Strategic Air Command (SAC) assets to handle a large share of its electronic intelligence needs. Eager to emerge from under the strategic nuclear umbrella that dominated American defense planning, TAC wanted to operate its own aircraft. The RB-66C, later redesignated EB-66C, in 1967 gave the tactical air forces their own jet powered reconnaissance aircraft. This improved capability allowed TAC to prepare for and fight the so-called limited wars of the sixties that would involve the extensive use of electronic warfare.
