Vladimir Ilich Lenin - Materialism and Empirio-criticism

A number of writers, would-be Marxists, have this year undertaken a veritable campaign against the philosophy of Marxism. In the course of less than half a year four books devoted mainly and almost exclusively to attacks on dialectical materialism have made their appearance. These include first and foremost Studies in [?it would have been more proper to say against] the Philosophy of Marxism (St. Petersburg, 1908), a symposium by Bazarov, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, Berman, Helfond, Yushkevich and Suvorov; Yushkevichs Materialism and Critical Realism ; Bermans Dialectics in the Light of the Modern Theory of Knowledge and Valentinovs The Philosophical Constructions of Marxism.

All these people could not have been ignorant of the fact that Marx and Engels scores of times termed their philosophical views dialectical materialism. Yet all these people, who, despite the sharp divergence of their political views, are united in their hostility towards dialectical materialism, at the same time claim to be Marxists in philosophy! Engels dialectics is mysticism, says Berman. Engels views have become antiquated, remarks Bazarov casually, as though it were a self-evident fact. Materialism thus appears to be refuted by our bold warriors, who proudly allude to the modern theory of knowledge, recent philosophy (or recent positivism), the philosophy of modern natural science, or even the philosophy of natural science of the twentieth century. Supported by all these supposedly recent doctrines, our destroyers of dialectical materialism proceed fearlessly to downright fideism). Yet when it comes to an explicit definition of their attitude towards Marx and Engels, all their courage and all their respect for their own convictions at once disappear. In deeda complete renunciation of dialectical materialism, i.e., of Marxism; in wordendless subterfuges, attempts to evade the essence of the question, to cover their retreat, to put some materialist or other in place of materialism in general, and a determined refusal to make a direct analysis of the innumerable materialist declarations of Marx and Engels. This is truly mutiny on ones knees, as it was justly characterised by one Marxist. This is typical philosophical revisionism, for it was only the revisionists who gained a sad notoriety for themselves by their departure from the fundamental views of Marxism and by their fear, or inability, to settle accounts openly, explicitly, resolutely and clearly with the views they had abandoned. When orthodox Marxists had occasion to pronounce against some antiquated views of Marx (for instance, Mehring when he opposed certain historical propositions), it was always done with such precision and thoroughness that no one has ever found anything ambiguous in such literary utterances.

For the rest, there is in the Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism one phrase which resembles the truth. This is Lunacharskys phrase: Perhaps we [i.e., all the collaborators of the Studies evidently] have gone astray, but we are seeking (p. 161). That the first half of this phrase contains an absolute and the second a relative truth, I shall endeavour to demonstrate circumstantially in the present book. At the moment I would only remark that if our philosophers had spoken not in the name of Marxism but in the name of a few seeking Marxists, they would have shown more respect for themselves and for Marxism.

As for myself, I too am a seeker in philosophy. Namely, the task I have set myself in these comments is to find out what was the stumbling block to these people who under the guise of Marxism are offering something incredibly muddled, confused and reactionary.

Vladimir Lenin. September 1908.