Thomas Aquinas - Works of Thomas Aquinas

The Collected Works of

THOMAS AQUINAS

(1225-1274)

Contents

Delphi Classics 2020

Version 1

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The Collected Works of

THOMAS AQUINAS

By Delphi Classics, 2020

Collected Works of Thomas Aquinas

First published in the United Kingdom in 2020 by Delphi Classics.

Delphi Classics, 2020.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of the publisher, nor be otherwise circulated in any form other than that in which it is published.

ISBN: 978 1 91348 730 0

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Aquino, a town in the province of Frosinone, in the Lazio region of Italy Thomas Aquinas birthplace

Thomas was most likely born in the castle of Roccasecca, Aquino, controlled at that time by the Kingdom of Sicily, c.1225.

QUESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE VERITATE

Translated by Robert W. Mulligan, 1952

In 1245 Thomas was sent to study at the Faculty of the Arts at the University of Paris.

The Sorbonne, Paris, in a seventeenth century engraving

The problem under discussion is truth,

AND IN THE first article we ask:

What is truth?

[Cf. S.T. , I. 16, aa. 1, 3; I Sent. , 19, 5, 1; C.G. , I, 60; I Perih. , lect. 3, nn. 3-10; VI Metaph. , lect. 4, nn. 1230-44.]

Difficulties

It seems that the true is exactly the same as being, for

1. Augustine says: The true is that which is. But that which is, is simply being. The true, therefore, means exactly the same as being.

2. It was said in reply that the true and being are the same materially but differ formally. On the contrary the nature of a thing is signified by its definition; and the definition of the true, according to Augustine, is that which is. He rejects all other definitions. Now, since the true and being are materially the same, it seems that they are also formally the same.

3. Things which differ conceptually are so related to each other that one of them can be understood without the other. For this reason, Boethius says that the existence of God can be understood if for a moment we mentally separate His goodness from His existence. Being, however can in no way be understood apart from the true, for being is known only in so far as it is true. Therefore, the true and being do not differ conceptually.

4. If the true is not the same as being, it must be a state of being. But it cannot be a state of being. It is not a state that entirely corrupts otherwise, this would follow: It is true. Therefore, it is non-being as it follows when we say: This man is dead. Therefore, this is not a man.

Similarly, the true is not a state that limits. If it were, one could not say: It is true. Therefore it is. For one cannot say that a thing is white simply because it has white teeth. Finally, the true is not a state which contracts or specifies being, for it is convertible with being. It follows, therefore, that the true and being are entirely the same.

5. Things in the same state are the same. But the true and being are in the same state. Therefore, they are the same. For Aristotle writes: The state of a thing in its act of existence is the same as its state in truth. Therefore, the true and being are entirely the same.

6. Thing not the same differ in some respect. But the true and being differ in no respect. They do not differ essentially, for every being is true by its very essence. And they do not differ in any other ways, for they must belong to some common genus. Therefore, they are entirely the same.

7. If they were not entirely the same, the true would add something to being. But the true adds nothing to being, even though it has greater extension than being. This is borne out by the statement of the Philosopher that we define the true as: That which affirms the existence of what is, and denies the existence of what is not. Consequently, the true includes both being and non-being; since it does not add anything to being, it seems to be entirely the same as being.

To the Contrary

1. Useless repetition of the same thing is meaningless; so, if the true were the same as being, it would be meaningless to say: Being is true. This, however, is hardly correct. Therefore, they are not the same.

2. Being and the good are convertible. The true and the good, however, are not interchangeable, for some things, such as fornication, are true but not good. The true, therefore, and being are not interchangeable. And so they are not the same.