Paul R. Viotti - Conflict and Arms Control: An Uncertain Agenda

Conflict and Arms Control

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Available in hardcover and paperback.

Management of superpower relations and, in particular, arms control continue to be among the most pressing issues on the international agenda. In a world without central governance, states face a security dilemma made critical by the presence of weapons of mass destruction. Contributors to this volume address a broad range of concerns in arms control, including prospects of an expanding military presence in space, problems related to maintaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the failure to negotiate effective strategic and theater arms reduction and control agreements, and the implications of "nuclear winter." In addition, they examine how the superpowers effectively manage their differencesfor example, through the use of the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, a forum in which both sides can confront one another with alleged violations of arms control agreements in an attempt to ensure compliance. They also critically evaluate traditional approaches to arms control and present alternatives, including non-military national defense.

Paul R. Viotti is a professor of political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy. He is the coauthor of The Defense Policies of Nations.

An Uncertain Agenda

edited by Paul R. Viotti

First published 1986 by Westview Press, Inc.

Published 2018 by Routledge
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Conflict and arms control.
(Westview special studies in international security)
1. Arms controlAddresses, essays, lectures.
2. Nuclear arms controlAddresses, essays, lectures.
I. Viotti, Paul R.
JX1947.C6827 1986 327.1'74 85-11483

ISBN 13: 978-0-367-00841-3 (hbk)

To the memory of Frank N. Trager

The annual meeting of the International Studies Association's Section on Military Studies held at the U.S. Air Force Academy on October 25-27, 1984, included the following remarks delivered by Donald M. Snow, professor at the University of Alabama and then chairman of the section:

It was less than a year ago, at our last annual conference in Monterey, that I stood before you at the banquet. At that time, I had the happy task of extolling the remarkable career of a revered and valued colleague, Dr. Frank N. Trager. Many of you were present at that time as I recited the enormous diversity of accomplishments of our colleague and friend for his critical role in founding and nurturing our organization from its humble beginnings to its present status as the largest section within ISA. At the end of that recounting, I was privileged to present an award on behalf of the Section on Military Studies to this colleague who touched the lives and careers of so many of us.

As you all know, Frank Trager passed away since that evening in Monterey, His death is a loss to us all, and it is appropriate that we remember him here in Colorado Springs, where so many here in attendance came in contact with him through the National Security Education Seminar. His passing, along with that of the late Fred Sondermann, leaves a void in the area of national security education that will be difficult, if not impossible, to fill. Frank Trager will be sorely missed.

The absence of central authoritythe condition of anarchyis the underlying condition of international politics that produces the security problem with which statesmen are forced to cope. Resolution of conflicts cannot be imposed by the actions of higher authority in the exercise of some right to settle disputes. Indeed, security is a self-help enterprise in a world of states that claim to be sovereign.

Engaging in the arms race does not assure increased security. Indeed, states frequently find themselves worse off in security terms to the extent that expenditure of resources on armaments has been matched (or even surpassed) by an adversary. How do states extricate themselves from this security dilemmathat spending more on armaments may even reduce security? To what extent can conflicts be managed? Can regimes or sets of rules be agreed upon to control conflicts and to constrain the arms race?

Many of the articles in this volume deal precisely with this Grotian questthe search for security through agreed rules that would control or manage both conflicts and arms behavior. Others would go even further, arguing for disarmament or non-military defense as means to security. The agenda is thus a wide one and is approached here from a diversity of perspectives. It is also an uncertain agenda. What is the future of strategic arms limitations or reductions regimes? Nuclear test bans? Nuclear proliferation? Nuclear free zones? Conventional arms reductions and transfer constraints? Agreements on confidence-building measures? The law of the sea? Military uses of space? Improved communications between adversaries? Limitations or prohibitions on chemical, biological, or radiological weapons? To what extent do regimes constructed to deal with these issues contribute to security?