C.J. Lowe - The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy 1878-1902

FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE GREAT POWERS

VOLUME I

The Reluctant Imperialists I: British Foreign Policy 1878-1902

C. J. Lowe

VOLUME II

The Reluctant Imperialists II: British Foreign Policy 1878-1902, The Documents

C. J. Lowe

VOLUME III

The Mirage of Power I: British Foreign Policy 1902-14

C. J. Lowe and M. L. Dockrill

VOLUME IV

The Mirage of Power II: British Foreign Policy 1914-22

C. J. Lowe and M. L. Dockrill

VOLUME V

The Mirage of Power III: 1902-22, The Documents

C. J. Lowe and M. L. Dockrill

VOLUME VI

From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914

F. R. Bridge

VOLUME VII

The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945

J. Nr

VOLUME VIII

Italian Foreign Policy 1870-1940

C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari

VOLUME IX

German Foreign Policy 1871-1914

Imanuel Geiss

VOLUME X

From Nationalism to Internationalism: US Foreign Policy to 1914

Akira Iriye

VOLUME XI

Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka

Ian Nish

First published 1967 by Routledge

Reprinted 2002 by Routledge

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C. J. Lowe 1967

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ISBN: 0-415-27366-8 (Volume 2)

ISBN 0-415-26597-5 (set)

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The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this

reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original book

may be apparent.

The purpose of these documents is less to define what policy was than to give students some idea of the dialogue that lay behind it. For this purpose most official despatchesnot allare inadequate since, as Renouvin points out, they do not explain the arrires penses. They did not need to: they were simply instructions to foreign service officials and, since they were liable to be published in a Blue Book, a good deal of caution was necessary. To get at the reasons behind policy it is necessary to read the private correspondence and, where possible, the memoranda prepared for the Cabinet. The latter are particularly useful in that they explain not only the alternative courses from which the choice has to be made but also the strategic factors which influenced the decisions. In a class of their own are the letters of the Prime Minister to the Sovereign. Sometimes, particularly in the case of Disraeli and Rosebery, they are fairly explicit in revealing the differences within the Cabinet or the real consideration behind policy. But it should be borne in mind that Queen Victoria was no disinterested spectator and often held strong views of her own: it is obvious that in many cases the letters were aimed as much at convincing her as at explaining Cabinet decisions. In this respect the view that she held of Gladstonethat he regarded her as another Department of Stateseems fully justified by his letters. They say very little beyond the bare bones of Cabinet decisions, though wrapping this up in such an involved style as to make it seem a lot.

It was also decided that the criterion for selection should be significance rather than novelty. Accordingly, although the majority of these documents are published here for the first time, a large number are selected from what is already in print. Since the sources for these are widely scattered and often out of print it was thought that this would perform a useful service. No doubt much of significance has been omitted either through lack of space or through ignorance on the part of the selector.

I am indebted to the Keeper of the Public Records for permission to reproduce the Cabinet Memoranda in the Cabinet 37 series. The letters to the Sovereign (Cab/41) are from photographic copies in the Public Record Office of original letters preserved in the Royal Archives and made available by the Gracious Permission of Her Majesty the Queen. Those of Lord Salisbury and Sir Michael Hicks Beach are printed by kind permission of the present Marquess and Earl St. Aldwyn. Acknowledgements are also due to the publishers of the following works from which quotations have been taken at length: Lady Gwendolyn Cecil, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, 4 vols. 192132 (Hodder and Stoughton); A. G. Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt, 2 vols. 1923 (Constable); A. Ramm, The political correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 187686, 2 vols. 1962 (O.U.P.)

C. J. LOWE

Of course, we have a right to object to all [of the Treaty of San Stefano] as all are contrary to existing Treaties, but it would be doubtful policy to do so in view of English opinion. At all events, I think we should put in the forefront of our objections:

(1)Those articles which menace the balance of power in the Egean.

(2)Those which threaten the Greek race in the Balkan Peninsular with extinction.

And that we should indicate the necessity of either cancelling, or meeting with compensatory provisions, the portions of the Treaty which, by reducing Turkey to vassalage, threaten the free passage of the Straits, and also menace English interests in other places where the exercise of Turkish authority affects them.

I am, as you know, not a believer in the possibility of setting the Turkish Government on its legs again, as a genuine reliable Power; and, unless you have a distinct belief the other way, I think you should be cautious about adopting any line of policy which may stake England's security in those seas on Turkish efficiency. I should be disposed to be satisfied with war or negotiations which ended in these results:

These are merely suggestions for your consideration and require no answer.

Extract

The existing arrangements made under European sanction which regulate the navigation of the Bosphorous and Dardanelles appear to them (Her Majesty's Government) wise and salutary and there would be, in their judgment, serious objections to their alteration in any material particular.