Damien Janos - Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity

Scientia Graeco-Arabica

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ISBN 9783110635980

e-ISBN (PDF) 9783110652086

e-ISBN (EPUB) 9783110651218

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There cannot be beauty or splendor surpassing the quidditys being purely intelligible [an takna l-mhiyyah aqliyyah maah], pure goodness, free from any deficiency, and one in all respects.

The essences of Avicenna are so many ghosts of Platos Ideas.

This theory obviously implies that all the flora and fauna are regularly destroyed, and then come to be again. Avicenna posited that this regeneration of the species is brought about by natural necessities, including the assistance of the agent intellect.

This book was a long time in the making. Its various parts were composed at different periods, in different places, and in different states of mind. My access to the primary sources required for such a large research project has been irregular, and I could not always get my hands on what I needed at a particular moment, or consult the best or most recent editions of certain texts. All of these variables are reflected in the book. In spite of its shortcomings, I hope that this study will stimulate further research on Avicenna and challenge some deeply entrenched assumptions concerning his philosophy. Even if scholars disagree with the solutions I proffer, I hope that the cluster of questions I raise will prove valuable and thought-provoking. In nuce, I try to show that Avicennas interpretation of the ontology of pure quiddity is complex and unique, and also forms the matrix of innumerable threads that unfold in the medieval and early modern periods and radically changed the philosophical landscape after him. Avicenna himself is just as remarkable for the longue dure philosophical problems he bequeathed to posterity as for the intricate interpretations he formulated in his works. Among other things, this study wishes to persuade the (still unconvinced) reader that Avicennas thought represents a crucial and unique moment in the history of philosophy and, more precisely, in the development of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic metaphysics and epistemology.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the following people: Frank Griffel, who conveyed innumerable comments and sound advice, which greatly improved the draft; Olga Lizzini, with whom I had several stimulating conversations; Jules Janssens for his valuable feedback; David Twetten, for a protracted and very constructive discussion; Amos Bertolacci for his help with the manuscript evidence on Avicenna; and Robert Wisnovsky for his unfaltering support and his readiness to share his expertise in Islamic intellectual history. I am also grateful to Rosabel Pauline Ansari, Pauline Froissart, Mateus Domingues da Silva, Salimeh Maghsoudlou, and Naser Dumairieh for sharing some results of their ongoing research and for their valuable suggestions, as well as Florian Ruppenstein at De Gruyter for his outstanding editing. Fariduddin Attars feedback and incisive comments also greatly improved the draft. Finally, I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Marwan Rashed. Not only did he accept to publish this study in his erudite series; his work on Avicenna and Yay b. Ad was a key source of inspiration for my analysis. Particularly in this case, I wish to acknowledge the precious help and contribution of these scholars and stress that any errors or misinterpretations of the evidence are entirely my own.

As the volume of research on Avicennas philosophy and its impact on subsequent intellectual history keeps growing, so does scholars appreciation of this thinkers contribution to the fields of logic, physics, psychology, and metaphysics. Although Avicenna, or Ibn Sn (d. 1037 CE) in Arabic, has always been considered a towering figure in Islamic philosophy, modern scholars are increasingly keen to describe his life and works as a landmark in the intellectual history of the Islamic world, and, more broadly, in the history of Western and medieval philosophy. If anything, the study of these intellectual developments has confirmed the hypothesis that Arabic philosophy did not die with Averroes in 1198 CE as a result of Ghazls (d. 1111 CE) earlier onslaught in his Refutation of the Philosophers (Tahfut al-falsifah).

As it turns out, complex philosophical systems were still being elaborated long after the end of the classical period, and Avicennas ideas contributed to this phenomenon in a decisive manner. Later Muslim scholars borrowed, criticized, and elaborated upon many of the theories that the master had articulated. With hindsight, it becomes easier to see that Avicennas philosophy is not just the end of the formative era of Islamic thought and the apogee of the classical period; it also marks the beginning of a new, highly diversified, and sophisticated philosophical culture in Islam, which lasted up to the present day in some parts of the world. During this time, philosophical ideas were expressed frequently in commentaries written on works of the shaykh al-ras, as well as in independent treatises and in large philosophical-theological summae. These works spanned the genres and disciplines of theology (kalm) and philosophy (ikmah). In modern parlance, they often displayed a combination of theological and philosophical concepts and theories. Yet, most of these works were marked in some way or other by Avicennas terminology, theories, and outlook.

One salient example of Avicennas influence on this later tradition, which happens also to coincide with his most famous contribution to philosophy in general, is his theory of the distinction between essence and existence. Avicenna argues that essence or quiddity (mhiyyah) and existence (wujd) are two distinct and irreducible notions in the mind and that one can think of the former without invoking the latter. That is to say, one can conceive of essence or quiddity solely in itself and in complete abstraction from any consideration of existence. Nevertheless, all caused and contingent beingswhether concepts in the mind or concrete entities in the worldhave an essence and an existence which can be apprehended together. The various implications of these claims for the fields of epistemology, ontology, and theology were endlessly discussed and debated in the post-Avicennian tradition, both in commentaries on Avicenna and in independent works of ikmah and kalm. What is more, the Avicennian terminological and conceptual framework that underpins this distinction was borrowed and refined by later authors to further their philosophical and theological projects. The unfolding of these complex processes of transformation and naturalization of Avicennas philosophy in the various fields that make up the intellectual landscape of postclassical Islam is fascinating, and it has deservedly received increased scholarly attention. But these developments are not by any means limited to Muslim authors. As is well known, many of the Christian philosophers of medieval Europe responded enthusiastically to Avicennas philosophical ideas, which contributed to shaping the scholastic discussions of essence and existence, causality, and the universals, to name only a few key topics. And there is growing evidence that Avicennas views had a profound impact on medieval Jewish thinkers as well.