Colonel Jean-Baptiste-Modeste-Eugène Vachée - Napoleon at Work

NAPOLEON AT WORK

BY

COLONEL VACHE

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH, WITH A FOREWORD,

BY

G. FREDERIC LEES

WITH TWO MAPS OF THE IMPERIAL EPOCH

AND A SKETCH MAP, ALSO FRONTISPIECE OF

NAPOLEON I. AND HIS STAFF, AFTER THE

PICTURE BY MEISSONIER

This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING

Text originally published in 1914 under the same title.

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Publishers Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Authors original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern readers benefit.

Among the various Lessons which the study of History offers, one of the most profitable is that which can be learnt by an examination of the minds of men who have exercised great power.

MATTHIEU DUMAS Prcis des vnements militaires , vol. VII. p. 355.

Let only command: several minds weaken an army.

MACHIAVELLIS Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius .

No work could be more appropriate at the present time than this study of the greatest military genius of all ages. Written by Colonel Vache, one of the most distinguished of French tacticians and strategists, with the distinct object of preparing military students for those battles of the future which are I now the wars of the present, it abounds with pages I which have a direct application to the mighty struggle which is in progress beneath our eyes.

The authors thesis is that by a careful examination of Napoleons methods and those adopted by the German Staff in 1870-71 we can formulate rules of warfare which will be of the greatest utility when face to face with an enemy. He takes his herothe hero of all who have made a study of war, despite his shortcomings and his errorsat the height of his career, and follows him step by step during the magnificent campaign of 1806. The Battle of Jena, and the events which led up to it, are subjected to the minutest analysis, and conclusions are drawn which lead one to believe that, in spite of the new factors which have entered into warfare during the last hundred years, everything is by no means antiquated in the methods inaugurated by Bonaparte. However inadvisable his excessive but unavoidable centralization may have been, it is evident that many lessons are still to be learnt from the greatest captain of modern times."

How interesting to learn these lessons whilst following the momentous events which are taking place at the present time on the old battle fields of the Continent! We must not seek in Napoleon's tactics for any system or narrow formula. But by observing his methods and reading the invaluable advice given in his Commentaries we can undoubtedly arrive at fundamental principles which are as true today as they ever were. The most difficult thing, said Napoleon, is to discover the enemy's plans, and to detect the truth in all the reports one receives; the remainder only requires common sense; it is a bout at fisticuffs, and the more blows you get in, the better it is for you.... The reason why I have won so many battles is this, that, on the eve of the fight, instead of giving an order to diverge, I converged all my forces on the point I wished to force, and massed them there. I overthrew that which was before me, for naturally it was a weak point. There we have a fundamental principle which is as valuable in our present struggle for liberty and the overthrowing of militarist ideals as it was when applied by the man who, notwithstanding his many admirable qualities, certainly did much to build up those ideals. A second principle of this master of war was to begin the fight, and get in as many blows as possible; the offensive in dead earnest along the whole line. Finally, at the weak point, and at the moment chosen by him, the General in Chief himself should give that formidable and decisive blow which overthrows his adversary.

The necessity for a great military personality, in whom his men place implicit faith, and who, on the eve of the fight, are filled with that sacred fire which Napoleon knew so well how to instil into their veins by words and material encouragements, should be carefully noted. The subject forms one of the most important sections of Colonel Vaches book, in which an attempt is made to answer that puzzling question What is the rle of the modern commander in chief, and where should he be stationed when the decisive struggle is taking place? If we consider the battles for which we are preparing, he says, with admirable foresight battles which will be fought with a front of one hundred kilometres we have a right to ask ourselves if the art of a commander will consist in being personally present during the whole day on that corner of the battlefield where he presumes the decisive blow will be given. However that may be, and it is as well, perhaps, to reserve our opinion on that point until the conclusion of the present war, in which for the first time millions of men are engaged on an enormous front, there can be no doubt as to the modern military ideal regarding the rle of a commander in chief. His decision is the result of a conference between a number of experts the lesson learnt from Von Mltke and the German Staff in 1870 71. But Colonel Vache does well to emphasize the necessity of carefully selecting the advantages and avoiding the dangers of this Staff conference. By rigorously following the methods of Von Mltke and his eight advisers, the resultant of a number of opinions is substituted for the will of a chief, which generally ends in an intermediate solution of a given problem. The orders are indeed given in the name of a leader who assumes responsibility for them, but the soldiers know that he is not their author, and that he has adopted without enthusiasm a collective creation. From the point of view of moral, this effacement of the leader has a tremendously debilitating influence on troops. Therefore, whilst favouring the application of the principle of the division of work, of the development of initiative, of a wide diffusion in the army of intellectual life, Colonel Vache believes that nothing can replace the personal work of a leader. By the very fact that he exists, and that his action is felt, he increases the 'sacred fire' which was in Napoleons army, lie gives a characteristic turn to the execution of his orders.

Our author follows up this striking passage with the illuminating words: A command thus exercised, if addressed to an army exalted by ideas of duty, patriotism, and sacrifice, will obtain from it that intense effort which is an almost certain pledge of victory; and he concludes by quoting that ever true maxim of Machiavelli, Let only one command in war: several minds weaken an army.

The reader, whilst observing how Napoleon succeeded in warfare, thanks to the manner in which he concentrated his forces, his marvellous activity, and his firm determination to perish with glory, must be left to judge for himself as to the manner in which these great but very simple directing principles of the art of war are being observed by ourselves and our glorious Allies. Let us beware, however, of drawing too hasty conclusions at the beginning of a struggle which leading military men contemplate will be a long one, and, if it is to be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, will necessitate all their science, fortitude, and patriotic ardour. It is better to play the part, not of critics, but of observers, who, convinced that they are on the side of justice, place all their confidence in Lord Kitchener, General Joffre, and the Grand Duke Nicholas of Russia.