James Johnson - AI and the Bomb: Nuclear Strategy and Risk in the Digital Age

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James Johnson 2023

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I have incurred many debts in writing this book, which I cannot possibly repay. What I can do, however, is acknowledge them and express my sincere thanks. Many colleagues read, commented, and in various ways contributed to the book at its various stages. I am especially grateful to James Acton, John Amble, Greg Austin, John Borrie, Lyndon Burford, Jeffrey Cummings, Jeffrey Ding, Mona Dreicer, Sam Dunin, Andrew Futter, Erik Gartzke, Andrea Gilli, Rose Gottemoeller, Rebecca Hersman, Michael Horowitz, Patrick Howell, Keir Lieber, Jon Lindsay, Giacomo Persi Paoli, Kenneth Payne, Tom Plant, Daryl Press, Bill Potter, Benoit Pelopidas, Adam Quinn, Andrew Reddy, Brad Roberts, Mick Ryan, Daniel Salisbury, John Shanahan, Michael Smith, Wes Spain, Reuben Steff, Oliver Turner, Chris Twomey, Tristen Volpe, Tom Young, and Benjamin Zala. The book greatly benefits from their comments and criticisms on the draft manuscript and separate papers from which the book draws. My appreciation also goes to the many experts who challenged my ideas and sharpened my arguments on the presentations I have given at various international forums during the development of this book.

I have also enjoyed the generous support of several institutions that I would like to acknowledge, including: the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies; the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Royal United Services Institute; the Modern War Institute at West Point; the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory; the US Naval War College, the UK Deterrence & Assurance Academic Alliance; the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Towards a Third Nuclear Age Project at the University of Leicester. I would also like to express my thanks for the encouragement, friendship, and support of my colleagues in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen.

My appreciation also to the excellent team at Oxford University Press for their professionality, guidance, and support. Not to mention the anonymous reviewers, whose comments and suggestions kept me honest and improved the book in many ways. Finally, thanks to my amazing wife, Cindy, for her unstinting support, patience, love, and encouragement. This book is dedicated to her.

On the morning of December 12, 2025, political leaders in Beijing and Washington authorized a nuclear exchange in the Taiwan Straits. In the immediate aftermath of the deadly confrontationwhich lasted only a matter of hours, killing millions and injuring many moreleaders on both sides were dumbfounded about what caused the flash war.

In an election dominated by the islands volatile relations with Communist China in 2024, President Tsai Ing-wenin another major snub to Beijingpulled off a sweeping victory, securing her third term for the pro-independence Democrats. As the mid-2020s dawned, tensions across the Straits continued to sour, as both sidesheld hostage to hardline politicians and hawkish military generalsmaintained uncompromising positions, jettisoning diplomatic gestures and inflamed by escalatory rhetoric, fake news, and campaigns of mis/disinformation. At the same time, both China and the US deployed artificial intelligence (AI) technology to support battlefield awareness, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and early-warning and other decision-support tools to predict and suggest tactical responses to enemy actions in real-time.

By late 2025, the rapid improvements in the fidelity, speed, and predictive capabilities of commercially produced dual-use AI applications