David L. Sloss - Tyrants on Twitter: Protecting Democracies from Information Warfare

STANFORD STUDIES IN LAW AND POLITICS

Edited by Keith J. Bybee

TYRANTS ON TWITTER

Protecting Democracies from Information Warfare

David L. Sloss

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Stanford, California

2022 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press.

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Sloss, David, author.

Title: Tyrants on Twitter : protecting democracies from information warfare / David L. Sloss.

Other titles: Stanford studies in law and politics.

Description: Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2022. | Series: Stanford studies in law and politics | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2021049970 (print) | LCCN 2021049971 (ebook) | ISBN 9781503628441 (cloth) | ISBN 9781503631151 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Social mediaPolitical aspectsWestern countries. | Social mediaGovernment policyWestern countries. | Social mediaLaw and legislationWestern countries. | Information warfarePolitical aspects. | Information warfareRussia (Federation) | Information warfareChina. | DemocracyWestern countries.

Classification: LCC HM742 .S588 2022 (print) | LCC HM742 (ebook) | DDC 302.23/1091821dc23/eng/20211108

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021049970

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021049971

Typeset by Newgen North America in 10/15 Galliard

CONTENTS

TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLES

FIGURES

PREFACE

THIS BOOK ADDRESSES the problem of Chinese and Russian information warfare. I define the term information warfare as the use of social media by state agents to conduct foreign influence operations. The book proposes a new Alliance for Democracy so that democratic states can develop a coordinated, transnational approach to regulating social media to protect the integrity of their democratic political systems from the threat posed by Chinese and Russian information warfare.

I completed work on the initial manuscript for this project in November 2020. Then, on January 6, 2021, there was a riot at the Capitol in Washington, DC, unlike anything the United States had experienced since the Civil War.

In light of the insurrection at the Capitol on January 6, one might legitimately ask whether the books focus on Chinese and Russian information warfare is misplaced. One could argue that the primary threat to American democracy comes not from foreign influence operations but from domestic disinformation campaigns. Indeed, after the events of January 6, if someone asked me to rank the significance of various threats to American democracy, I would rank domestic disinformation higher, and foreign interference correspondingly lower, than I would have before January 6. Even so, there are two primary reasons why a book focusing on Chinese and Russian information warfare is still timely and important.

First, Chinese and Russian information warfare poses a threat to democracies around the world, not just in the United States. The books central argument is framed in terms of the global threat to democracy. , Chinese technology companies are helping to strengthen autocratic control in several countries by exporting digital authoritarianism, and China is exploiting social media to conduct foreign influence operations in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Taiwan, to name but a few states. Furthermore, as of this writing (in May 2021), there is no evidence that domestic sources of disinformation have been sufficiently influential to spark events comparable to the January 6 riots in other leading Western democracies. Thus, from the perspective of the global struggle between democracy and autocracy, Chinese and Russian information warfare remains a topic of vital concern.

Second, from a U.S. perspective, the First Amendment imposes significant limitations on the governments power to regulate domestic sources of disinformation., the proposed ban is constitutionally defensible when applied to Chinese and Russian agents.

Two very different aspects of my own professional background shaped my thinking about the proposed transnational regulatory system. First, during the Cold Warbefore I became a law professorI spent almost a decade in the U.S. government, where I worked on East-West arms control negotiations. During that time period, I developed substantial expertise in designing arms control verification systems. The proposed system for defending Western democracies from Chinese and Russian information warfare draws on my expertise in arms control verification systems. Second, during my academic career, I have developed substantial expertise in U.S. constitutional law. Accordingly, I designed the proposed transnational regulatory system to be consistent (or arguably consistent) with constitutional limitations on the governments power to regulate speech.

Critics may argue that the proposed transnational regulatory system is flawed because it does not solve the useful idiot problem. Russian strategists refer to foreigners who unwittingly help advance Russias foreign policy goals as useful idiots. Donald Trump is a classic example of a useful idiot. By spreading the message that the 2020 presidential election was tainted by fraud, Trump helped advance Russias goal of undermining the faith of U.S. citizens in the integrity of American democracy. There is

The useful idiot problem is a serious problem that merits a thoughtful policy response. My proposed transnational regulatory system does not solve that problem. However, it bears emphasis that no regulatory proposal can solve every problem. This book focuses on information warfare conducted by foreign cyber troops, not domestic disinformation. The useful idiot problemas illustrated by Donald Trumps effort to promote the Big Liefalls outside the scope of my proposal because it fits in the category of domestic disinformation, not information warfare.

Implementation of the proposed ban on Chinese and Russian agents is not cost-free. The primary cost is thatto make the ban effectivemembers of the Alliance for Democracy would need to implement a social media registration system requiring citizens and nationals of Alliance member states to register their social media accounts with their home governments if they want to engage in public communication on social media. focuses primarily on the threat of information warfare.)

does not alter the conclusion that domestic disinformation and foreign information warfare are analytically distinct problems that, although related, warrant separate treatment.

This book contributes to the scholarly and public policy debate by analyzing Chinese and Russian information warfare as a distinct threat to democratic governments, and by proposing and evaluating policy solutions tailored to that threat. Many readers will not be persuaded that my proposed policy solutions are the best possible solutions. Regardless, I hope that the book will help readers gain a better understanding of the threat posed by Chinese and Russian information warfare, and that it may prompt readers to develop their own ideas about how Western democracies can and should defend themselves against that threat.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS