David M. Leibowitz - The Ironic Defense of Socrates: Platos Apology

David Leibowitz

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, So Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo, Mexico City

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521194792

I am grateful to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Mrs. Giles Whiting Foundation, and Kenyon College for the financial support that made this book possible. I am also grateful to my many friends and teachers who contributed to making the book much better than it would have been, though not as good as it would be if I had been able to respond adequately to all of their generous criticisms. I would especially like to thank Thomas L. Pangle, whose boundless intellectual energy, wealth of knowledge, and magnanimity benefited me in ways too numerous to catalogue; Arthur Melzer and Jerry Weinberger, whose incisive questions and heroic assistance were invaluable; Fred Baumann, whose profound insights into the reality principle proved essential; and Robert Goldberg, whose eye-opening conversations with me about the central topics in this book began during our late-night drives back in high school. Harvey C. Mansfield and Werner J. Dannhauser offered very helpful suggestions for improving the manuscript, as did the anonymous readers for Cambridge University Press. I received much sage advice from Lewis Bateman, my editor at Cambridge, and from his assistants, Emily Spangler and Anne Lovering Rounds, and much help in preparing the final text from Barbara Folsom and Holly Johnson. My understanding of Plato in general, and of the Apology of Socrates in particular, owes more than I can say to the classes and writings of Christopher Bruell and Leo Strauss.

My greatest debt is to my wife, my partner in all things, for as the ancients held, philosophy is a way of life.

Thirty-five Platonic dialogues have come down to us as genuine. In various ways, then, Plato encourages the reader to have high expectations about what he or she will learn from the Apology .

These expectations, however, are not fulfilled in a straightforward manner. To some degree this is concealed by the dialogues effect on most readers. It is hard not to be exhilarated, even thrilled, by Socrates elevated and uncompromising words, words that convey a strong impression of his dignity, his courage, his devotion to the god and to the Athenians, and his serenity in adversity.

Now precisely if knowledge of virtue is as important as Socrates keeps saying or implying, his own life must have been a great disappointment. To borrow an image from the Republic , he is a prospector who never struck gold (336e49). What is worse, he suggests that the failure is not his alone: by calling his wisdom human wisdom, he seems to imply that no greater wisdom is possible for human beings. In fact, he says explicitly that knowledge of virtue would be some superhuman wisdom, and not only does he not possess it himself, he has been unable, despite a most painstaking search, to find anyone who does (20b45, 20d9e2, 21a47, 21e522a1, 22e623b4). But our beliefs about virtue about what is just or admirable guide us. They are the basis of our self-respect, and perhaps ultimately of our hopes for happiness (cf. 41c8d2). If Socrates is correct, however, these beliefs are unfounded; they cannot withstand examination; they are all just so many boasts. Everyone is in the dark about how to live. And if so, isnt it cause for despair? Is this what Plato offers through the mouth of Socrates, then a counsel of despair?