Troy D. Harman - All Roads Led to Gettysburg: A New Look at the Civil Wars Pivotal Battle

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Copyright 2022 by Troy D. Harman

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Names: Harman, Troy D., author.

Title: All roads led to Gettysburg : a new look at the Civil Wars pivotal battle / Troy D. Harman.

Description: Guilford, Connecticut : Stackpole Books, [2022] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: Gettysburg Ranger and historian Troy Harman reframes the story of the Battle of Gettysburg from the historical view that it was an accidental battle to show that it was instead a logical and strategic clash, based on his years of researching the Civil War and studying the terrain of Gettysburg, south-central Pennsylvania, and northern Maryland Provided by publisher.

Identifiers: LCCN 2021051884 (print) | LCCN 2021051885 (ebook) | ISBN 9780811770637 (cloth) | ISBN 9780811770651 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Gettysburg, Battle of, Gettysburg, Pa., 1863. | Military planningUnited StatesHistory19th century. | StrategyHistory19th century. | Gettysburg, Battle of, Gettysburg, Pa., 1863Historiography.

Classification: LCC E475.53 .H33 2022 (print) | LCC E475.53 (ebook) | DDC 973.7/349dc23/eng/20211109

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021051884

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021051885

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information SciencesPermanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

F irst, I want to thank my wife Lisa and son Daniel who are my love and inspiration. They have loved and supported me in too many ways to express. Also, the love and example of my father and mother, Jim and Patricia Harman, motivate me every day, as well as my sister Michon, brother-in-law Jeff, niece Anora, and nephew Leland. I am also grateful for the many insights of my father-in-law Stephen R. Gohr and the support of family Carolyne Gohr, Stephen Gohr, Lyne, Mike, Sam, and Ben Kohr.

This book started out as a dissertation at Lehigh University. I would like to thank my committee for their guidance in that process, particularly my dissertation director Dr. John K. Smith, who provided the original supervision on gathering the evidence and framing the argument. He read through several drafts and raised questions that strengthened the central argument and gave insight on how to build continuity throughout the dissertation. Dr. Stephen H. Cutcliffe did the same in raising historical questions, calling for clarifications, flagging awkwardly worded sentences, recommending structural changes, and proofreading for grammar. He carefully read through three drafts, instructing and mentoring through the process. I am grateful to the late Dr. John C. Pettegrew for his verbal guidance in a committee meeting and his willingness as an authority on Civil War history to be on my committee. Finally, I want to thank Dr. James I. Robertson, who I have revered since I was in high school as one of the leading Civil War scholars in my generation. He steadfastly supported me in this process.

I want to thank Rowman & Littlefield copyeditor Josh Rosenberg for his skill, discernment, and direction in editing the manuscript for publication, as well as senior production editor Elaine McGarraugh for guidance in the process. A special thanks to history editor David Reisch, Stackpole Books, who helped the book become a reality by bringing it into the pipeline and by being a steady presence and director at each stage, while editorial assistant Stephanie Otto kept me consistently informed of the next step from contracts to book illustrations. Much appreciation to Hal Jespersen and Philip Laino for their expertise in maps that visually recreate moments in the battle and add another dimension to the story.

I would also like to thank John Winkleman, Tim Cramer, Anthony Kellon, Charles Teague, Bill Hewitt, Gregory A. Coco, Craig Caba, Dean Shultz, Stan McGee, John Fuss, and Mike Vallone for their insight and input on matters of the Union right flank at Gettysburg over the years.

T his book argues against the standard interpretation of the Battle of Gettysburg as an accidental, last-option fight in a sleepy, little remote Pennsylvania town, far from strategic centers of importance, but rather depicts it as a predictable battlefield situated between the major Susquehanna and Potomac Rivers, located on the Monocacy River (hereafter Monocacy) headwaters at the nexus of several improved roads, and linked to the outside world by a railroad. Gettysburg was a prototypical battlefield dependent on water, rail, and improved roads necessary to sustain an armys presence in one location for more than twenty-four hours, and entirely consistent in location with logistical concerns for protecting key symbolic places and strategic communication corridors. Though the clash at Gettysburg has traditionally been viewed as an accidental collision, I believe it emerged as a logical point of contact for both army commanders. This book shows how all operational and tactical decisions came down to the essentials of water, rail, and road.

This is not the position taken by other general histories on the battle of Gettysburg that have focused on most matters other than naturally suitable conditions for battle in south-central Pennsylvania. The most influential general histories written in the last sixty years, Coddingtons Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (1968), Sears, Gettysburg (2003), Browns Retreat From Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics and the Pennsylvania Campaign (2005), and Guelzos relatively recent Gettysburg: Last Invasion (2013), have all looked at Gettysburg from the perspective of an unintended fight at worst or an accidental meeting engagement at best. They did not portray Gettysburg as a logically predictable battleground based on the confluence of water, rail, and roads, the central ingredients to every Civil War battle location. Moreover, these general histories did not reduce operational and tactical level decisions down to the essentials of water, rail, and road.

Edwin Coddington has been the most influential Gettysburg battle historian over the last sixty years with his Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, a work that had immediate and lasting impact. His tactical study of the battle is important because it was the first general history to reject the 1950s convention that Lt. Gen. Robert E. Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg due to mistakes of his corps commanders. It became the first work of its kind to not linger on Confederate mistakes. Coddington did not seek to defend Lee; he was just simply tired of the narrative that focused on Confederate command debacles, rather than recognizing right decisions made by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade and his corps commanders. In short, Coddington believed the explanation for Lees defeat rested with Meade and his corps commanders actions more than shortcomings of Lees subordinates.