Michael Andrew Kappelmann - Parallel Campaigns: The British In Mesopotamia, 1914-1920 And The United States In Iraq, 2003-2004

This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHINGwww.picklepartnerspublishing.com

To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books picklepublishing@gmail.com

Or on Facebook

Text originally published in 2013 under the same title.

Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publishers Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Authors original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern readers benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

PARALLEL CAMPAIGNS: THE BRITISH IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-1920 AND THE UNITED STATES IN IRAQ, 2003-2004

By

Major Michael Andrew Kappelmann

Contents

PARALLEL CAMPAIGNS: THE BRITISH IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-1920 AND THE UNITED STATES IN IRAQ, 2003-2004, by Major Michael Andrew Kappelmann.

The Mesopotamia Campaign of World War I and Operation Iraqi Freedom of the Global War on Terrorism took place on the same geographic and human terrain. Though separated by nearly a century, a significant number of points of comparison are evident, particularly with regard to strategic and operational missteps. In both cases Western armies successfully invaded and occupied the present-day region of Iraq, and both armies suffered the effects of difficult insurgencies in the wake of their conventional campaigns. This thesis explores parallel mistakes committed by the political and military leadership of each operation in order to determine what aspects of the Mesopotamia Campaign might have provided useful precedents to the planners of Operation Iraqi Freedom. These comparable operations suggest an argument for studying history during the formulation of strategy and the design of supporting campaigns. If the American leadership had closely examined the earlier British encounter in Iraq, then it may have been able to avoid repeating some of that operations costly and deadly aspects.

Researching and composing this thesis has been a tremendous privilege. I would first like to thank the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College for this opportunity. I have not always applied myself fully in respect to academics, but I can honestly say that this school brought out the best in me. For the first time, I gave the last full measure of devotion to my studies and to this thesis in particular. Each of the committee members contributed a unique aspect. Dr. Hull, as a World War I historian and fellow veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom, served as chairman, and I could not have asked for better. I also feel very fortunate for having a military historian as renowned as Dr. House on this committee. His ability to quickly read draft chapters and provide corrections was a tremendous help in making deadlines. Col Stephen Brown, USMC (Retired), served on the Third Army staff during Operation Iraqi Freedom and provided insight on many of the considerations that drove campaign planning. Dr. al-Marashi of California State University San Marcos generously gave his time to guide my research and steer me on topics with regard to Iraqi perspectives and proper transliteration. My Art of War Scholars professorsDrs. Kalic, Stephenson, and Fischerexpanded my boundaries for military history and professional writing in ways I never imagined. Being part of this program was the highlight of opportunities that CGSC offered during my studies here. Finally, I must thank my family. My wife, Nichelle, took care of our children and home in San Diego while I went to school in Leavenworth. She did this while continuing her career as an award-winning news anchor. Our son, Christopher, was a tremendous help to her even while excelling in his own high school academics and earning letters in cross country and track. Talking on the phone with our daughter, Ellie, who is not quite two, always brought me joy, especially at the busiest moments. I hope she forgives my missing her first steps and words. My sincerest gratitude to all. All errors and omissions are my own.

1/71st Battalion, 7th Marines

ADArmored Division

APOCAnglo-British Petroleum Company

ASPAmmunition Supply Point

CJTF-7Combined Joint Task Force Seven

CPACoalition Provisional Authority

ICDCIraqi Civil Defense Corps

IDInfantry Division

IGCInterim Governing Council

IEDImprovised Explosive Device

IEF DIndian Expeditionary Force D

GWOTGlobal War on Terror

MEFMarine Expeditionary Force

MEUMarine Expeditionary Unit

OIFOperation Iraqi Freedom

SFGSpecial Forces Group

UNSCUnited Nations Security Council

Figure 1. Surface View of the Wadi al-Salaam from the North

Figure 2. Aerial View of Rotary Wing Close Air Support in the Wadi al-Salaam

Figure 3. Surface View of Rotary Wing Close Air Support in Najaf

Figure 4. German Warships Goeben and Breslau at the Dardanelles, August 1914

Figure 5. Cadmus-class Gun Sloop HMS Odin

Figure 6. Aerial View Painting of the Siege at Kut, 1916

Figure 7. Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force Marching into Baghdad, March 1917

Figure 8. Prince Feisal and Colonel Lawrence at Versailles, 1919

Figure 9. Aerial View of Najaf, 1920

Figure 10. Siege of Rumaitha, July 1920

Figure 11. Blockhouse #19 at Baghdad, 1920

Figure 12. Formal Surrender of Tribes at Najaf, November 1920

Figure 13. Coronation of Feisal at Baghdad, August 1921

Figure 14. Kurdish Civilian Casualties of Chemical Warfare, March 1988

Figure 15. Marines Fighting on Urban Terrain at Nasiriyya, March 2003

Figure 16. 3d Infantry Division Enters Baghdad from the West, April 2003

Figure 17. 1st Marine Division Enters Baghdad from the East, April 2003

Figure 18. Aftermath of Baghdad UN Headquarters Bombing, August 2003

Figure 19. Attack of Jaysh al-Mahdi Militiamen in Sadr City, April 2004

Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators. Since the days of Halaka, your city and your lands have been subject to the tyranny of strangers, your palaces have fallen into ruins, your gardens have sunk in desolation, and your forefathers and you have groaned in bondage. Your sons have been carried off to wars not of your seeking; your wealth has been stripped from you by unjust men and squandered in distant places. Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Maude, The Proclamation of Baghdad

In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near. President George W. Bush, War Ultimatum Speech

The above quotations reflect the narratives of two Western campaigns, separated by nearly a century but executed on almost the same physical and human terrain. The British, during the Mesopotamian Campaign, and the American-led coalition of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) both portrayed themselves as armies of liberation and expected the gratitude and cooperation of the Iraqi people. However, in each case those people greeted their occupiers with distrust and eventually outright hostility. Deadly insurgencies erupted, and for both Western militaries, winning the peace proved costly and difficult. During the initial phases of OIF, I was a lieutenant, serving at the tactical level of war, and I had no role in planning the campaign. However, I was as guilty as any strategic or operational planner of having glowing assumptions about how the Iraqis would receive us. Two personal stories account for how I came to acknowledge this.