Steve Wood - Germany and East-Central Europe: Political, Economic and Socio-Cultural Relations in the Era of Eu Enlargement

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has been widely regarded as the locomotive for major economic and, increasingly, political developments in Europe. Germanys political leaders consistently justified its integrationist policy direction and provision of around 60% of net transfers to the European Union (EU) by reference to a consolidation of peace and security, and to its trade interdependence with EU states. The EU has undertaken its largest ever enlargement to include eight and later at least two more countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Focusing on the period leading to these states formal accession, this book examines relations between Germany and, principally, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. These three comprise East-Central Europe (ECE). The book incorporates political-diplomatic, economic-commercial, and socio-cultural fields, and correlated bilateral and multilateral contexts. Whilst aiming for topicality it also is mindful of powerful historical influences on contemporary European politics. It pursues the following enquiries: What were the motivations for German policies towards these countries and EU enlargement? What developments or forces assisted or countered them? What characterises popular attitudes to common themes in Germany and ECE? What effects do different sectors and actors have on processes of integration and on bilateral relations? What reciprocal effects are there with wider international affairs? What benefits and costs does enlargement present for Germany?

It is argued here that whether advocating enlargement, now steered to accommodate national preferences in a more insistent manner, promoting private sector engagement, or encouraging civil and intellectual exchange, the German state, under successive governments, has been the crucial actor in the processes of CEE transition and accession to the EU. This was not primarily an exercise in altruism although it involved considerable fiscal transfers. The Schroder government had to absorb huge pressures from within and outside the German polity to maintain an enlargement course. It did so because the alternatives were perceived as untenable, and only then with detours. From 198990 CEE was seen as a possible security threat due to the uncertain internal situation of individual states and the region as a whole. The widening of NATO to include the three ECE states was a substantial step towards resolving that challenge. The region was also viewed as offering enormous opportunity if its transition could be effectively managed. After a promising start, the heralded economic potential was muted, for a variety of reasons, while the costs of enlargement-related measures rose. Financial strains exacerbated by a flat German economy aggravated disputes among old and new members about funding and distribution of the EU budget. There was not much convincing evidence that, on balance, the venture would soon produce positive returns for the German public. In 1988 the FRG would have paid almost any price to have the eastern half of Europe join the then European Community (EC). A decade and more later, perceptions about enlargement, its potential effects on and opportunities for Germany were more pessimistic.