Bernd Horn - Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces

W hen I returned from Rwanda, I was convinced that our officer professional development system was failing the Canadian Forces, the government, and therefore, the Canadian people. This, I believed, was especially the case for senior officers and General and Flag officers. I had served my whole career during the Cold War but was woefully unprepared for what transpired afterward in places like Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and beyond. The new strategic and operational environment, unlike the period 194989, was not linear; it was far more complex and ambiguous, and unpredictable concurrent actions by these diverse disciplines, from humanitarian to combat/security, did not fit with our classic manoeuvre attrition warfare background. I realized that this environment called for a new kind of leadership and a much greater focus on the intellectual development of our officer corps. The old emphasis on the experiential and training dimension of professional development had to be reoriented to include a much greater educational component. But what is the right balance between these two dimensions of development of our officer corps? The warrior ethic is fundamental, but it is not enough to achieve mission success.

Fortunately, in the wake of the controversial report of the Somalia Commission in 1997, entitled Dishonoured Legacy , and led by the very dynamic minister of defence, the Honourable Doug Young, the system slowly began to change. I was directly involved in the first stages of this much needed reform, first as assistant deputy minister human resources and then for over a year as the Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff on Officer Professional Development (with emphasis on the officer corps).

After my medical retirement in April 2000, others took up the challenge against ongoing resistance. Bill Bentley and Bernd Horn were also involved from the beginning and, in fact, remained involved up until the present. In Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Forces , they have provided a comprehensive and insightful account of the whole period, supported by the testimony of virtually all the key players. Part study of Canadian civil-military relations, part study of intra-organizational cultural change, and related as contemporary history, it is a salutary story of an institution struggling to adapt and come to grips with the national security and military issues of the 21st century and how to prepare officers for them.

It is, however, an ongoing story, and if the past is prologue, the lessons drawn out in this volume will prove very useful moving forward. And we must continue moving forward because I am not convinced that we are yet adequately preparing our senior officers for the myriad challenges they will face at the operational, strategic, and political/strategic levels in defence of Canada. Are they meeting the challenges of a multi-disciplinary arena when integration of capabilities is the norm in the face of ever more complexity and ambiguity?

Lieutenant-General (Retired), The Honourable Rom o Dallaire

W e believe that the subject of this book has deep meaning for many military and civilian individuals who believe in a strong national profession of arms. Those who are concerned that their men and women in uniform, as well all those who belong to the larger Defence Team, be properly trained and educated so they can meet the challenges of both today and tomorrow. They are the ones who believe in a robust professional development program and a strong learning organization mentality that encourages taking lessons from both successes and failures. As such, we owe a great deal of gratitude to all those who shared their experiences, thoughts, insights, and reflections with us. Their willingness to discuss events, motives, and beliefs goes a long way to providing insight that will help others. It also demonstrates their deep respect and attachment to the profession of arms in Canada.

We would also be remiss if we did not thank Lieutenant-General (Retired), the Honourable Senator Rom o Dallaire for graciously writing the foreword to this book. Lieutenant-General Dallaire has been, and remains, an impassioned champion of a highly educated officer corps. He has done much to blaze a trail in this regard, and we are honoured for his support of this project.

In addition, Cathy Sheppard has our thanks for her continual willingness to dig up key documents and assist with the myriad tasks that make a project such as this possible. Finally, but by no means least, we wish to thank our wives Kim and Rebecca for their unrelenting support. Their strength and assistance allows us to continue to work on projects such as this.

The Canadian military was in crisis. Divorced from the population and being used as a punching bag by the government.

General Rick Hillier

T here is no doubt that there was a crisis in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in the period 19922000, with ramifications that have extended up to the present. The crisis was centred around the Somalia Incident, beginning with the torture and killing of a Somali teenager in 1992 by Canadian troops deployed on a United Nations mission in Somalia. It developed into a crisis in Canadian civil-military relations as well as a crisis in terms of military professionalism. At its core were issues of military ethos and leadership, which were all bound up with the professional development of CAF officers. The proximate causes of the crisis can be readily traced beyond the deserts of Somalia to much broader issues such as the end of the Cold War and the rapidly emerging new security environment globally in the late 1980s and early 1990s, for which the CAF officer corps was woefully unprepared. These considerations are covered in Chapter One. However, deeper roots can be found in the ambivalence concerning officer training, and especially education, going back to the end of the Second World War.

Canada was never central to the major political and strategic questions that were the preoccupation of the U.S., Russia, and the U.K. from 193945. By wars end, nonetheless, politicians and many senior officers were well aware that the challenges of the postwar era were daunting. For a short period it was taken for granted that the preparation of the officer corps to meet these challenges should be a priority within the defence community. But this concern was not sustained, and the important issue of officer development was dealt with only intermittently over the succeeding decades.

As early as 1947, Brooke Claxton, the minister of national defence, asserted that officer training was one of the most important matters to be dealt with in the organization of the armed forces. In the same year, the Inter-Service Committee on Officer Training recommended that a university degree be the entry standard for any officer. This recommendation would appear several more times over the years before it became policy in 1997. In addition, the committee suggested that the Royal Military College of Canada and Royal Military College in Esquimalt be established as tri-service military colleges where aspiring officers would receive their university education. By 1952 this had been accomplished, along with the establishment of a third service college, le Collge Militaire Royale at Saint-Jean, Quebec, to ensure Francophones had an equal opportunity.