Fremont-Barnes - Battle Story Goose Green 1982

The terrain at Goose Green was largely boggy and, of what solid ground existed, the troops found it covered in babies heads, the name given to describe the round tussocks of grass ubiquitous to the islands. Owing to the unevenness and hardness of the babies heads, a soldier could easily twist an ankle or knee, particularly in the dark, thus rendering him hors de combat even before he made contact with the enemy.

On 30 May, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Jeremy Moore and Brig. Tony Wilson arrived at San Carlos, with Moore assuming from Thompson the position of Land Forces Commander Falkland Islands, while Wilson waited for the arrival of his 5 Brigade, consisting of a battalion each of the Royal Gurkha Rifles, the Welsh Guards and the Scots Guards, plus supporting arms from the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Signals, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, the Royal Army Medical Corps and other corps. Thompson moved the headquarters of 3 Commando Brigade to Teal Inlet, enabling him to control his forces at closer proximity to their new positions, while Moore found the circumstances of his new command looking very positive: he controlled a secure base at San Carlos, a fully functioning forward operating base at Teal Inlet, and 2 Para had achieved a resounding victory at Goose Green.

When 5 Brigade arrived at San Carlos, most of it was earmarked for movement east on the southern flank facing the Stanley defences, though a continued shortage of helicopters prevented Moore from shifting most of 5 Brigade east while at the same time trying to provide the food and ammunition needed for the forward units from 3 Commando Brigade. The Gurkhas, however, were put to good use replacing 2 Para at Goose Green. Wilson wanted to move his brigade on foot to the mountains west of Stanley via the southern route. However, in the absence of settlements in which his troops could rest and resupply on the route to Fitzroy, a distance of 56km (35 miles) from Goose Green, and in light of the fact that neither of the two guards battalions, in contrast to the paras and marines, were accustomed to marching such distances, the 5 Brigade commander had to abandon this plan. Nevertheless, when a small group from 2 Para, travelling by helicopter, discovered Fitzroy and Bluff Cove free of Argentine troops, Moore ordered the whole battalion shifted by Chinook and Scout helicopters, which they accomplished on 23 June, with most of 5 Brigade to follow by sea since helicopters were needed to ferry supplies forward. Accordingly, the Scots Guards arrived safely at Bluff Cove on 6 June. The Welsh Guards followed in their wake, only to come under air attack near Fitzroy while aboard the Sir Galahad on the morning of 8 June, losing fifty-four dead and about 150 wounded in a fiery inferno, which left most of the battalion hors de combat for the remainder of the fighting.

The campaign now reached its climax, consisting of a series of engagements fought in the mountains just west of Stanley. Even without the troops lost at Goose Green, Menendez still commanded more than 11,000 troops across the islands. Moreover, even after deducting those garrisoning West Falkland, where they could perform no useful purpose in halting the British advance, this still left about 9,000 men in and around Stanley, although only about 5,500 of whom consisted of infantry, with those in the mountains much demoralised by cold, the shortage of food and knowledge of the defeat of their comrades at Goose Green. With such troops a combination of stalwart marines and infantry of mixed levels of motivation and experience Menendez could not hope to halt the forward progress of British forces and now faced the prospect of imminent defeat. True, his forces occupied sangars, bunkers and trenches covered by machine-guns and artillery, and in many cases protected with extensive minefields; but the Argentines had failed to establish defences in depth, with sufficient numbers or enjoying a proper degree of fire support.

A British helicopter ferrying equipment via underslung netting. Both sides suffered badly from insufficient numbers of helicopters. Across a landscape almost totally lacking in roads, this left the attackers short of equipment and ammunition and obliged many of their troops to yomp or tab, while the same problem denied the Argentines the ability to launch a counter-attack against the beachhead at San Carlos.

Moore had originally planned to attack the defences around Stanley on the evening of 89 June, but shortages of supplies in particular the lack of sufficient artillery shells close to the frontline delayed this by two nights. A further postponement of twenty-four hours occurred when the crippling of the Sir Galahad interfered with the helicopter schedules, although other helicopters arrived via another vessel on 9 June. These circumstances thus delayed the movement of British troops in forward areas by four days and nights in adverse conditions specifically, 3 Para, 45 Commando and 42 Commando, all situated in the areas around Mounts Vernet, Kent and Challenger, with the Scots Guards from 5 Brigade beyond Bluff Cove. The British had to attack imminently before increasingly harsh conditions especially rapidly dropping temperatures in exposed positions sapped their strength, damaged their health and consequently affected operational effectiveness. Exposure had yet to take a significant toll, but this was now only a matter of time. Further delays could also compromise success, particularly when heavy seas threatened to imperil marine supply lines. The Argentines were scarcely better off in terms of the effects of deteriorating weather, but their conditions stood marginally better, with shelter established in prepared positions and in Stanley behind them, whereas British troops now stood well east of San Carlos.