Roy Harris - Mindboggling: Preliminaries to a science of the mind

Preface

You may think that Do you have a mind? is either a badly formulated question or else an insult to your intelligence. This book sets out to convince you that it is neither, by presenting some of the main arguments for and against the existence of minds. These are arguments that need to be dealt with before there can be any question of constructing a science of the mind (or, for that matter, of the brain, or of both).

Do you have a mind? may sound to some scientists like a question that only philosophers are likely to ask. There is some truth in this. But this book is not a potted history of philosophy of mind, nor of psychology. However, it raises certain issues that are basic to both enterprises, and especially to the question of whether the human mind falls within the province of the natural sciences at all.

Anyone who asks Do you have a mind? invites the facile answer: It all depends on what you mean by mind . But this is not a purely verbal question, and cannot be settled any way you like just by opting for whatever definition you prefer. I shall try to show why not.

Another reaction that I confidently anticipate is: it is absurd to write a book on this subject, because anyone who can write (or read) a book (on anything) must by definition have a mind. But, I shall maintain, although having a mind is inextricably bound up in various ways with having a language, it is simplistic to treat the latter as evidence for the former.

In setting out my case I shall try to avoid technical terminology as far as possible. This is not because my aim is to present a dumbed-down version of the issues for the benefit of scientists with no background in psychology or philosophy or linguistics, but because I believe that in many cases the technical terminology has actually served to obscure or confuse those issues. When I have occasion to discuss the claims of various authorities, I shall give exact references and verbatim quotations, in preference to reliance on paraphrasing their pronouncements. In order to avoid any suspicion of rigging the evidence, when a passage needs to be translated from some language other than English, I shall cite other peoples translations, in preference to supplying my own. Although I comment on many views about the mind, and list a large number of bibliographical references at the end, I have not attempted to give an introduction even to the basic reading on the subject: that would have required far more space than I have allowed myself.

I do not disguise my own views about the mind, but I try not to insist on them. The aim is to enable readers to see clearly where they disagree with me and where they dont. I make no attempt to present an impartial account of these issues. What I say is part of an intellectual autobiography, reflecting my own digestion of and reactions to ideas about the mind that I have encountered. My excuse for this autobiographical approach is that it is more honest than any attempt at impartiality. Unlike Galileo before the Inquisition, I am not obliged to pretend that conflicting opinions are equally worthy of respect, or that there is an ultimate truth of the matter laid down in Holy Writ (or the modern equivalent about to be revealed in the scriptures of Science).

There is, of course, an argument of my own about the mind that I want to put forward, and I would not have written this book otherwise. But I think the book can be read with profit even if you come to the conclusion that my argument fails to convince you, and that a science of the mind can go ahead without me.

Each chapter deals with one particular boggle about the mind. I try in each case to explain how it arises and what to make of it. In the end, Do I have a mind? is a question that individuals must answer for themselves. My main concern is to distinguish between silly and sensible ways of understanding the question, and to explain why it is a question worth taking seriously. My own answer will be found in the final chapter.

R.H.

Oxford , January 2008