John P. Cann - The Fuzileiros : Portuguese marines in Africa, 1961-1974

Also by John P. Cann:
Counterinsurgency in Africa. The Portuguese Way of War 1961-74
Flight Plan Africa: Portuguese Airpower in Counterinsurgency 1961-1974
Brown Waters of Africa. Portuguese Riverine Warfare 1961-1974
A@W The Flechas. Insurgent Hunting in Eastern Angola, 1965-1974

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Cover design by Paul Hewitt, Battlefield Design
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Printed by Henry Ling Ltd, Dorchester Dorset

Text John P. Cann, 2016
Monochrome/color images and maps as individually credited

Every reasonable effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright material. The author and publisher apologize for any errors or omissions in this work, and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should be incorporated in future reprints or editions of this book.

Cover: LDM 301 landing a section of DFE 13 on a bolanha in the Cacheu River.
(Source: Personal archive of Admiral Nuno Vieira Matias)

ISBN: 978-1-910777-64-0
EPUB ISBN: 978-1-911096-82-5

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CONTENTS

GLOSSARY

INTRODUCTION

Between 1961 and 1974, Portugal faced the extremely ambitious task of conducting three simultaneous counterinsurgency campaigns in Guin, Angola and Mozambique. It was at the time neither a wealthy nor a well-developed country. In fact, it was the least wealthy Western European nation by most standards of economic measure thus for Portugal in 1961 to have mobilized an armed force, transported it many thousands of miles to its African colonies, established a sophisticated logistic infrastructure to support it, equipped it with special weapons and matriel, and trained it for a very specialized type of warfare was a remarkable achievement. It is made even more noteworthy by the fact that these tasks were accomplished without any previous experience, doctrine, or demonstrated competence in the field of either power projection or counterinsurgency warfare, and thus without the benefit of any instructors who were competent in these specialties. To put this last statement in perspective, other than periodic pacification efforts, Portugal had not fired a shot in anger in Africa since World War One, when Germany invaded Northern Mozambique and Southern Angola.

The Portuguese defense establishment was quite familiar with the principles of counterinsurgency, was aware that its troops were not going to fight a classic conventional war and understood that forces had to be modified and adapted to the job at hand. There was substantial concern throughout the armed forces in undertaking what would be a wholesale and radical change in force structure and training, as it would affect all aspects of traditional tactics, techniques and procedures. It would very much disturb the status quo, and thus professional career paths. Nevertheless, Portugal proceeded to adapt its forces to a new way of war and created a force uniquely tailored to fight in this new struggle. It changed its forces to fit the war rather than trying to fight a war with the wrong forces.