Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - The Functions of Law

(p.iv)

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I would like to thank the following individuals and organizations, without whose support and advice this book would not have been possible.

Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Michael Giudice, George Pavlakos, Karin Boxer, David Enoch, Scott Shapiro, Detlef von Daniels, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Gurpreet Rattan, John Gardner, Les Green, Julie Dickson, Ken Himma, Norvin Richards, Fred Schauer, Ekow Yankah, Mark Murphy, Guyora Binder, William Twining, Dennis Patterson, Corrado Roversi, Zsofia Zvolenszky, Luka Burazin, Haris Psarras, John Searle, Amie Thomasson, Lucas Miotto, Cindy Phillips, James Specyal, Triantafyllos Gkouvas, Michael Pardo, Neil Williams, Randy Dipert, Barry Smith, Ken Shockley, my colleagues in the Philosophy Department of the University of Alabama, University College and the Oxford Centre for Ethics and Philosophy of Law, the University of Alabama Research Grants Committee, Mr. Ernest Sanford Williams and the Williams Fund of the University of Alabama, the Oxford Reading Group on the philosophy of action, the participants in the 2015 Krakow Workshop in Legal Philosophy, the participants in the 2015 Spring Workshops of the Edinburgh Legal Theory Research Group, my brother, Ethan, and my wife, Hanako.

I continue to be thankful to my dissertation committee, with whom I worked on some of these ideas in embryonic form: Jeremy Waldron, Joseph Raz, Jules Coleman, Stephen Perry, and Stephanie Beardman.

The following sections in the book draw on previously published work:

Chapter , Section C: Accepted for publication as Law as Plan and Artifact (2016, forthcoming) 7 Jurisprudence.

Chapter