Buber Martin - Between Man and Man

by Maurice Friedman

When Dag Hammarskjlds plane crashed in Northern Rhodesia, the Secretary General of the United Nations had with him the manuscript of a translation that he was making of Martin Bubers classic work I and Thou. It is because of this book and the philosophy of dialogue that it presents that Dag Hammarskjld repeatedly nominated Martin Buber for a Nobel Prize in literature. I and Thou is recognized today as among the handful of writings that the twentieth century will bequeath to the centuries to come, but for many readers this compact and poetic little book needs an introduction to be properly understood and applications to concrete fields of human experience to be properly appreciated. More than any other work of Bubers, Between Man and Man provides this introduction and these applications. The opening essay on Dialogue, in particular, with its contrast between dialogue and monologue and its personal anecdotes, represents the best introduction to Bubers philosophy of dialogue, while the other essays in this volume show its applications for such concerns as religious ethics, politics, social philosophy, marriage, education, psychology, art, the development of character, and philosophical anthropology, or the study of the problem of man.

In his Foreword to Between Man and Man, Martin Buber states that the five works brought together in this volume fill out and apply what was said in I and Thou. Dialogue clarifies the dialogical principle presented in I and Thou, illustrates it, and makes precise its relation to essential spheres of life. The terminology and scope of I and Thou are different from those of Dialogue, however. In I and Thou, Buber contrasts mans two primary attitudes the two ways in which he approaches existence. One of these is the I-Thou relationship, the other the I-It. The difference between these two relationships is not the nature of the object to which one relates, as is often thought. Not every relation between persons is an I-Thou one, nor is every relation with an animal or thing an I-It. The difference, rather, is in the relationship itself. I-Thou is a relationship of openness, directness, mutuality, and presence. It may be between man and man, but it may also take place with a tree, a cat, a fragment of mica, a work of artand through all of these with God, the eternal Thou in whom the parallel lines of relations meet. I-It, in contrast, is the typical subject-object relationship in which one knows and uses other persons or things without allowing them to exist for oneself in their uniqueness: The tree that I meet is not a Thou before I meet it. It harbors no hidden personality that winks at me as I pass by. Yet if I meet it in its uniqueness, letting it have its impact on me without comparing it with other trees or analyzing the type of leaf or wood or calculating the amount of firewood I may get out of it, then I may speak of an I-Thou relationship with it. The person that I meet is, by courtesy of our language and our attitudes, a person before I meet him. But he is not yet a Thou for me until I step into elemental relationship with him, and if I do not step into this relationship, even the politest forms of address do not prevent his remaining for me an It. I cannot, of course, produce an I-Thou relationship by my own action and will, for it is really mutual only when the other comes to meet me as I him. But I can prevent such a relationship from coming into being if I am not ready to respond or if I attempt to respond with anything less than my whole being insofar as my resources in this particular situation allow.