Haely - Objectivity in the Feminist Philosophy of Science

Continuum Studies in Philosophy

Series Editor: James Fieser, University of Tennessee at Martin, USA

Continuum Studies in Philosophy is a major monograph series from Continuum. The series features first-class scholarly research monographs across the whole field of philosophy. Each work makes a major contribution to the field of philosophical research.

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Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion, Aaron Preston

Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus, Christopher Brown

The Challenge of Relativism, Patrick Phillips

Demands of Taste in Kants Aesthetics, Brent Kalar

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature, Justin Skirry

Descartes Theory of Ideas, David Clemenson

Dialectic of Romanticism, Peter Murphy and David Roberts

Hegel's Philosophy of Language, Jim Vernon

Hegel's Philosophy of Right, David James

The History of Intentionality, Ryan Hickerson

Kierkegaard's Analysis of Radical Evil, David A. Roberts

Leibniz Reinterpreted, Lloyd Strickland

Metaphysics and the End of Philosophy, H.O. Mounce

Nietzsche and the Greeks, Dale Wilkerson

Origins of Analytic Philosophy, Delbert Reed

Philosophy of Miracles, David Corner

Platonism, Music and the Listener's Share, Christopher Norris

Popper's Theory of Science, Carlos Garcia

Role of God in Spinoza's Metaphysics, Sherry Deveaux

Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue, James Delaney

Rousseau's Theory ofFreedom, Matthew Simpson

Spinoza and the Stoics, Firmin DeBrabander

Spinoza's Radical Cartesian Mind, Tammy Nyden-Bullock

St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War, John Mark Mattox

St. Augustine of Hippo, R.W. Dyson

Thomas Aquinas & and John Duns Scotus, Alex Hall

Tolerance and the Ethical Life, Andrew Fiala

Karen Gordrick Haely

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Karen Cordrick Haely 2008

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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN-10: HB: 0-8264-9954-6
ISBN-13: HB: 978-0-8264-9954-7

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Haely, Karen Cordrick.

Objectivity in the feminist philosophy of science/Karen Cordrick Haely.

p. cm.

ISBN 978-0-8264-9954-7
1. Science-Philosophy. 2. Feminist criticism. I. Title.

Q175.H216 2008
501-dc22 2007036223

I wish to thank Louise M. Antony for sharing her philosophical insight and helpful critique that made this project possible, as well as for her patience in correcting both my stylistic and philosophical errors. I also wish to thank Don Hubin and George Pappas for their suggestions and guidance, especially in the earliest stages of this project when it was at its worst, and Robert Kraut for cultivating my interest in Quine. I am also grateful to Hank Kreuzman who has given me philosophical guidance and critique for nearly two decades. Finally, I wish to thank Ryan, Kevin, my parents, Jeff and other family and friends who have encouraged and supported my efforts to complete this project.

This text presents analyses of some of the more prominent feminist views of scientific objectivity, which largely stem from positions of critique of the philosophy and practice of science. I will spend considerable time explicating the critiques themselves, the reasons for the critiques, and reasons why the critiques might be compelling. But ultimately, I will suggest that taken individually these views offering useful ways to think about objectivity in science, and how to maximize it, aren't nearly as useful as they are taken collectively.

That is, sometimes in looking for the one view that is most useful, or most comprehensive, we neglect the network of views that can give us clues as to what we ought to think about a given philosophical problem. This network for which I have no technical definition or grandiose programme is simply a set of ideas or best practices that helps rather than hinders our ideas about a particular issue or problem, in this case scientific objectivity.

Here Fll be tackling the issue of objectivity in science as seen from feminist perspectives. This is done not to suggest that other, nonfeminist views of objectivity aren't of philosophical interest, but rather to narrow the focus of a field that is vast. In addition, the feminist critiques of science have recently come under some fire for being social constructive in nature, or for being overly cynical about what scientists are really up to, or for themselves being overtly political.accusation that has been launched at feminist critics of science). Rather, views arise from their feminist perspectives that are of philosophical and, I'll suggest, practical value.

Much can be learned by examining the views of feminists who address the notion of objectivity to make feminist-oriented points about knowledge, and in particular, scientific knowledge. In the chapters that follow, I will examine some prominent feminist theories about objectivity and intend to piece together a network of ideas that assist us in: (a) shedding light on just how complex this concept is; (b) developing a clearer understanding of current feminist ideas about objectivity; and (c) showing why many feminists, including myself, still think that some kind of objectivity is necessary for the success of science. In general, the views examined in this text offer conceptions of objectivity that are intended to allow us to increase the extent to which our scientific theories are objective, but at the same time allow us to appreciate (and not eliminate) the role of cultural and personal interests and values as they play a role in science.

In , I outline some philosophical views that serve as a foundation or starting place for many of the late-twentieth-century feminist critiques of science, namely from Kuhn and Quine. I believe it makes sense to place the discussions of the objectivity or subjectivity of science into a historical context, as it will become clear to the reader that the feminist critics of science were not the first to wonder about the extent to which the scientific method really provides us with a reliable way to churn out objective knowledge, though they were the first to seriously consider the effect of gender both the gender of the actual scientists and cultural beliefs about gender on what we call science. As well, Quine's arguments about viewing knowledge as a network of beliefs laid a foundation for my own view, which is that collectively, the various suggestions feminists have given us about enriching the concept of objectivity provide a valuable part of that network of knowledge.

In find the truth. So, under the broader sense of science a structured, systematic inquiry MacKinnon's views are certainly useful. Her views about objectivity focus on the extent to which political or social power can play a role in what we call objective. Her observations about the role of power in creating knowledge serve to underscore once again why feminists are interested in objectivity in the first place. Though MacKinnon does not focus on the objectivity of science, her worries about the role of power in forming knowledge serve as an appropriate warning for feminists who are working to construct conceptions of scientific objectivity. I'll also suggest that the conception of objectivity ought to be restructured and enriched, and that feminists should resist the temptation to give up on objectivity in scientific inquiry altogether, which MacKinnon sometimes talks of doing.