Craig L. Symonds - Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay

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Craig L. Symonds 2022

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Symonds, Craig L., author.
Title: Nimitz at war : command leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay / Craig L. Symonds.
Other titles: Command leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2022] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021052633 (print) | LCCN 2021052634 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780190062361 (hardback) | ISBN 9780190062378 (UPDF) |
ISBN 9780190062385 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Nimitz, Chester W. (Chester William), 18851966. |
World War, 19391945Naval operations, American. |
World War, 19391945Pacific Ocean. | Leadership. |
United States. Pacific CommandBiography. | United States. NavyBiography. |
AdmiralsUnited StatesBiography.
Classification: LCC D767.N56 S96 2022 (print) | LCC D767.N56 (ebook) |
DDC 940.54/5973092 [B]dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021052633
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021052634

To

E. B. Ned Potter

and to

Timothy Bent

Nearly fifty years ago, as a new assistant professor in the History Department at the U.S. Naval Academy, I shared an office suite with Elmer B. Ned Potter. Ned had taught at the Naval Academy since before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. He was also the co-editor with Chester Nimitz of the book Sea Power (1961), which we all used as a text in the required naval history course that I subsequently taught at the Academy for thirty years. Ned knew Nimitz well, having worked closely with him on Sea Power. Neds biography of the admiral (entitled, simply, Nimitz) appeared in 1976, and he kindly gave me an inscribed copy. I still have it.

Since we shared a telephone line, I often took calls intended for him. My favorites were from his wife, Grace, a Virginia lady in every sense of that term. She never identified herself, as in Hello, Craig, this is Grace Potter. She never had to. When I heard, Wheyal, halloh thayaheach word two distinct syllablesit could be no one else. I never got a call from Nimitz, since he had died in 1966, but Nimitz was very much a part of the many conversations Ned and I had about naval history until Ned retired in 1977. We remained friends until he died twenty years later, in 1997. I hope he would have approved of the wartime portrait of the admiral that I offer here.

This is not a biography of Chester Nimitz. It is, instead, a close examination of his leadership during his three and a half years directing World War II in the Pacific Theater when his actions and decisions guided the course of the war and helped determine its outcome, the legacy of which we still live with today. In many ways, it is remarkable that he assumed such a role. National traumasocial, political, economic, and militaryproduces a cultural tension that can challenge democratic norms. In such circumstances, the loudest, most aggressive voices often assume leadership roles. During World War II, military and naval leaders such as Admiral Ernest J. King, General Douglas MacArthur, Admiral Bull Halsey, and General George Patton all rose to prominence. All were talented and competent. All were also larger-than-life figures whose temperament, stubbornness, self-assurance, and impatience characterized their leadership. They were, and are, polarizing figures.

Nimitz, like Generals George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, exemplified another leadership style, a quieter one that depended on intelligent listening, humility, and patience. Nimitz did not shrink from hard decisionshe was, at critical moments, as bold as any commander in the war. Yet he believed that ultimate success depended on accommodation as well as determination, on humility as well as aggressiveness, on nurturing available human resources as well as asserting his authority. Rather than impose orders, he elicited solutions; he sought achievement, not attention. He unified. His was a quiet, calm, yet firm hand on the tiller during an existential crisis, and his leadership style reinforced rather than challenged democratic norms. It is a leadership template more relevant than ever.

The focus and purpose of this book is to recreate and evaluate Admiral Chester Nimitzs experiences in the 1,341 days during World War II in the Pacific when he commanded, directed, and supervised the largest naval force ever assembled in the largest naval war ever fought.

as always, there are a number of individuals who have helped me in the preparation of this work. In addition to the inspiration provided by Ned Potter at the beginning of my career, I am indebted to my editor at Oxford, Tim Bent, who has mentored me during the more recent phases of that career. Tim and I have worked together on several book projects. Despite the inherent tension that exists between author and editor, he has always found the perfect balance of praise and criticism, suggestions and applause, andlike Nimitz himselfhe has been patient and encouraging throughout. Over the many years of our association he has also become a valued friend. This book is dedicated to both Ned and Tim.

There are many others who lent their support and to whom I owe thanks. At the top of the list is Richard B. Frank, who read the entire manuscript carefully and saved me from a number of errors while also suggesting new ways of looking at particular issues. John B. Lundstrom read much of the manuscript and was both generous and meticulous in his comments and suggestions. In particular, he encouraged me to rethink Nimitzs management of the Coral Sea action. Jon Parshall helped me further refine my understanding of the Battle of Midway. Admiral Nimitzs twin grandsons, Chester (Chet) Lay and Richard (Dick) Lay, read all of the manuscript and offered encouragement and advice. Elliot Carlson read the two chapters dealing with Robert Ghormley and directed me to a number of useful sources, and Thomas J. Cutler read the chapter on Leyte Gulf. Barrett Tillman and James Sawruk helped me with technical details concerning U.S. fighter planes. All of them are generous to a fault, and I greatly appreciate their time and expertise. As always, of course, any errors that remain are mine alone.