Stedman - Jagdflieger

The fighter arm was regarded as the lesser branch of pre-war Luftwaffe airpower: the bomber particularly the dive-bomber was to be the war-winning element. The primary function of the Jagdwaffe (fighter arm) was to achieve and secure air superiority, without which all strategic operations would suffer heavily, if not fail. This goal was achieved over Poland in 1939, France in 1940 and Russia in 1941; it was very nearly achieved over England in 1940, and later over Malta, but in those cases the prize was ultimately lost through German underestimation of the fighter arms achievements, and untimely switches of target.

Invariably starting campaigns in style, the fighters were before long pushed onto the defensive, becoming and remaining over-tasked. Although the pilots were consistently able to inflict heavy casualties upon their enemies, these were short-term victories of little or no strategic value, since the Allies greater resources allowed such losses to be replaced. The destruction of enemy day-fighters, even in great number, had diminishing effects, and as the strength of the USAAF bomber force in England steadily increased in 194344 even the occasional slaughter of these heavy babies ceased to threaten Allied strategic aims. The achievements of the night-fighters, in their struggle to prevent British bombers from reaching their targets, were of far greater value to the defence of German industry, military capability and civilian population; yet these victories, too, were of limited effect against such overwhelming odds. The fighter arm was constantly forced to evolve and adapt, and met every challenge that was thrown at it (and not always from its enemies).

Despite any perceptions of glamour, the real war that the Jagdflieger had to endure involved great mental and physical strain, and it took enormous courage to return to the fray, again and again, despite his overstretched nerves. He ran the daily risk of death or severe wounds loss of limbs, paralysis, or disfiguring burns; and he usually lost the best friends he would ever have. His personal conflict usually stayed with him long after the war, the memories and even feelings of survivor-guilt often intensifying over the years. (Tony Sara)

Jagdflieger (fighter crewman)

The Luftwaffe produced all of the worlds leading Experten (aces), a small number achieving three-figure totals of aerial victories that are never likely to be equalled. Even by night, a few were able to out-perform the best Allied pilots daylight achievements. These men represented a tiny percentage of Luftwaffe fighter pilots, but today they too-frequently monopolize the attention of commentators. The average fighter pilot was no ace.

Like all fighter pilots of the day, he had undergone up to two years of training before his first combat mission. Many did not survive that first engagement; and for those who did, most of their subsequent combats were inconclusive. At best, the average pilot may have inflicted some damage on a few enemy aircraft, but he seldom brought one down. In time he might develop the necessary instincts to do so, but this was generally a slow process.

The one key difference between the Jagdflieger and his foreign contemporaries was the duration of his frontline service. Assuming he survived, he had no option but to continue in a task that most others endured for only a limited period; those Allied pilots who returned to squadron service after completing a tour of several months, and a period instructing or performing some other rear-area task, did so by choice. The odds were stacked against the German aircrews survival; nevertheless, to most of the pilots, radio-operators and gunners, supported by their ground-crews, all that mattered was to be Jagdflieger.

Some milestone dates in the history of the Jagdwaffe:

A pilot poses in his Messerschmitt Bf109E in a camouflaged dispersal pen, c. 1941. Unlike some elements of the other services, the Luftwaffe was operating at full stretch from early in the war, and the strain on men and equipment merely got worse as the months and years passed. (Kristof Dongleur)

Between the ages of 10 and 14 many German boys joined the Deutsche Jungvolk (German Youth) movement, which replaced German participation in the World Scouts Organization (rejected as a Jewish-led spy network). The DJ encouraged the acceptance by the new generation of order and authority, vital to the planned regeneration of Germany. From the DJ they progressed to the more overtly political Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth); originally voluntary, from 1936 membership became compulsory for all 14-year-old boys. Regular drill and marches engendered discipline and team spirit, and an annual two-week camp encouraged leadership potential. The great majority seem to have taken pleasure in the opportunities available to them in the HJ, which included mountaineering, sailing, orienteering, and of particular interest to those aspiring to Luftwaffe service the chance to qualify as pilots at