Richard G. Head - Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations

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Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations

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Westview Special Studies in International Relations

Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations
Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short, and Robert C. McFarlane

In the nuclear era, the use of even low levels of force risks catastrophe for all mankind. Yet military force remains an important element of political strategy, and control and coordination of its use with other instruments of national power is of vital importance.

The authors of this book, examining two crises that occurred during the Ford administrationthe Mayaguez incident and the murder of two U.S. Army officers in the Korean DMZdescribe the crisis communications and coordinative mechanisms used by the president, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of State. Summarizing, as well, the literature on crisis management and resolution, they present a comprehensive analysis of how intelligence is gathered and analyzed; how U.S. interests are defined; how diplomatic and military options are developed; how decisions are made (drawing on the actual minutes of National Security Council meetings); and how these decisions are implemented by U.S. diplomatic missions and military forces in the field.

The book is the first to present an authoritative view of how each department functioned internally and externally during the crises. The analysis, based on personal interviews, of what factors loomed largest in the decision-making processes of President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger, General Scowcroft, and others, is particularly incisive and makes a unique contribution to the literature on crisis resolution.

Richard G. Head is a colonel in the U.S. Air Force and a military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. At the time of this research he was a student at the National War College and an associate research fellow with the Research Directorate of the National Defense University. Frisco W. Short, a retired colonel, U.S. Army, was formerly a senior research fellow at the National Defense University. He spent more than two years on the joint staff developing procedures associated with the management of international crisis. Robert C. McFarlane is a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps, currently assigned to the National Defense University, where he is a senior research fellow. He spent more than three years on the staff of the National Security Council and a year as a White House Fellow.

Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations

Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short, and Robert C. McFarlane
Foreword by Vice Admiral M. G. Bayne
Published in cooperation with the National Defense University

First published 1978 by Westview Press, Inc.

Published 2018 by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright 1978 Taylor & Francis

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Notice:
Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Head, Richard G.
Crisis resolution.
(Westview special studies in international relations)
Bibliography: p.
1. Mayaguez Crisis, May 1975. 2. United StatesForeign relationsKorea (Democratic People's Republic) 3. Korea (Democratic People's Republic)Foreign relationsUnited States. 4. Decision-making. I. Short, Frisco W., joint author. II. McFarlane, Robert C., joint author. III. Title.
E865.H4 353.008'9 78-9514

ISBN 13: 978-0-367-01764-4 (hbk)

For Elaine, Jane, and Jonny

Contents

, Vice Admiral M. G. Bayne

1. ii
2. iii

Guide

Figure

Table

It must count as one of the truly dramatic ironies of policy research that crisesphenomena which if allowed to escalate could threaten mankind's very existencehave received relatively little attention as an area for focused study. This is particularly true among practitionersofficials in governmentamong whom the incentive for improving our knowledge of crises and our ability to cope with them ought to be highest. Such work as has been done, much of it quite good, has been predominantly by serious students and scholars in the academic world. In a few cases, officials who have experienced crises in public life have left government and written analytically of crisis resolution, and these have been among the most useful contributions to the literature. All in all, however, our knowledge of crises, what causes them, how to prevent them, and how to resolve them, is very primitive. With apologies to Mark Twain, it seems that "everyone talks about crises but no one ever does anything about them" in a procedural sense.

This is not to say that parts of the Washington community haven't learned valuable lessons from past crises. The tremendous effort by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop the World Wide Military Command and Control System received its principal impetus from communications breakdowns during the 1967 Israeli attack on the Liberty and the 1968 North Korean attack on the Pueblo. Other examples could be cited from the intelligence and diplomatic sectors. But these are internal measures taken by one department in isolation from the others. Even today, postcrisis critiques tend to be done by executive departments, or even narrow directorates within departments, and the staff officer or historian often lacks the mandate or the freedom to investigate across organizational boundaries. Seldom to my knowledge has the U.S. government looked at how all the actorsthe president, the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and others-all bring their expertise together and collectively go about resolving crises. That's what this book is all about.

The authors' objective has been to advance what we know of low order crisis in several important respects. Their method has been to analyze two specific crises with a view toward defining what factors were most important in shaping the president's decisions. Their work is particularly absorbing in that it is not based upon tenuous extrapolation or inference but on the precise views of the principals involvedPresident Ford, Secretary Kissinger, General Jones, General Scowcroft and others.

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