Wyn Q. Bowen - Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink

Stepping back from the brink

Wyn Q. Bowen

ADELPHI PAPER 380

The International Institute for Strategic Studies
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ADELPHI PAPER 380

First published May 2006 by Routledge

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First issued in hardback 2017

Transferred to Digital Printing 2010

Copyright 2006 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

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EDITOR Tim Huxley
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ASSISTANT EDITOR Jessica Delaney
PRODUCTION Jesse Simon
COVER IMAGE Marwan Naamani/AFP/Getty Images
CARTOGRAPHER Steven Bernard

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

ISBN 978-0-415-41238-4 (pbk)
ISBN 978-1-138-45212-1 (hbk)

ISSN 0567-932X

The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the JSCSC, the Defence Academy, the UK Ministry of Defence or of any other government agency.

ANO Abu Nidal Organisation

ADI Arab Development Institute

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

HEU Highly Enriched Uranium

IAEA International Atomic Energy Authority

IDF Israeli Defense Force

ILP Islamic Liberation Party

IMM Islamic Martyrdom Movement

ILSA Iran-Libya Sanctions Act

IRA Irish Republican Army

IRT-1 IRT-1 research reactor

JIC Joint Intelligence Committee

LEU Low-Enriched Uranium

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NBSR National Board of Scientific Research

NOC National Oil Corporation

NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSDD National Security Decision Directive

OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OTA Office of Technology Assessment

PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation

PSI Proliferation Security Initiative

RCC Revolutionary Command Council

SCOPE Scomi Precision Engineering

SIS Secret Intelligence Service

TNRC Tajoura Nuclear Research Centre

UCF Uranium-conversion facility

UF4 Uranium tetrafluoride

UF6 Uranium hexafluoride

UO2 Uranium dioxide

UO3 Uranium trioxide

U3O8 Uranium oxide concentrate ('yellowcake')

UAE United Arab Emirates

UNSCOM UN Special Commission in Iraq

WMD Weapons of mass destruction

The Libyan government announced on 19 December 2003 that it had chosen to abandon its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes, as well as to forego its long-range ballistic missile capability. The official statement announcing the decision noted that 'Libya has decided, with its own free will, to get rid of these substances, equipment and programmes and to be free from all internationally banned weapons'. The announcement took most non-proliferation practitioners and observers by surprise. It was the result of quiet negotiations involving Libya, Britain and the United States which had been the subject of intense secrecy with only a handful of officials in each government either involved in or aware of the talks. Libya would dismantle its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes completely and restrict its missile capability to systems with ranges of no greater than 300km in line with the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). A commitment was made to undertake these measures transparently, including the acceptance of international verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCVV) in the nuclear and chemical fields respectively.

The regime of Colonel Muammar Gadhafi had long been suspected of possessing chemical and, potentially, biological weapons capabilities. Its desire to acquire nuclear weapons was also well documented, despite Libya's status as a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Until Libya's decision to forego weapons of mass destruction (WMD), publicly available assessments generally concurred that-in the absence of significant and sustained injections of foreign technology and assistance-the country's technical and scientific capabilities were too under-developed to allow the indigenous development and production of nuclear weapons. However, since December 2003 it has emerged, as a result of investigations by America, Britain and the IAEA, that Libya was further advanced in the nuclear realm than previously thought.

It appears that Gadhafi's regime began seeking to acquire nuclear weapons shortly after seizing power from King Idris I in 1969. In an initial effort to procure such a capability directly 'off the shelf', the regime approached the People's Republic of China during the period 1969-71, although Beijing declined these advances. Ultimately, these efforts to acquire nuclear weapons came to nothing, thus increasing the importance of finding a source for the requisite technology, materials and components to manufacture nuclear weapons domestically.

From the 1970s to late 2003, Gadhafi's regime sought to acquire key elements of the nuclear-fuel cycle from abroad, notably uranium-enrichment capabilities. Ultimately, during the second half of the 1990s, Libya became a key beneficiary of the illicit proliferation network established by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadir Khan. The A.Q. Khan network became a pivotal 'target of opportunity' for the regime from 1997 through to 2003, with the Libyans spending millions of dollars in return for significant infusions of nuclear technology and expertise.

This paper examines Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and the factors that in the end influenced the Gadhafi regime to forego its ambitions in this area. It begins by examining the motives underlying Libya's nuclear ambitions from the 1970s through to the 1990s. The motives, or 'drivers', are placed into context through an examination of Gadhafi's foreign and security policies, including the ideological motivations that spawned its radical approach to international relations during this period. This provides the necessary background for examining the drivers in more detail. They revolved primarily around a security imperative, specifically the regime's desire to deter external interference and intervention in Libya by states in its immediate neighbourhood and further afield.