Jonathan Haslam - Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence

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Intelligence is for us sacred, a matter of ideals.

Stalin

Fear has large eyes.

Russian proverb

Agenturst : operative responsible for running agents

Aktvnaya razvdka / aktvka (active intelligence): terrorism and sabotage

Aktvnye meropriytiya (active measures): black propaganda, dirty tricks, etc.

Boeve shfry : working ciphers

Bolshi Dom (literally, the Big House): Comintern; later the Lubyanka

Chertvyrtyi : the Fourth Directorate of the Staff/General Staff, later GRU

Dez ( dezinformtsiya ): disinformation

Enkavedst : employee of the NKVD (GUGB), state security

Ente-ervsev : scientific and technical intelligence operative

Gmma : ciphering sequence/one-time pad

Gebst : state security operative

Gebervskii : state security operative

Gereshnik : GRU operative

Kagebst/kagebshnik : KGB operative

Kirpch (literally, brick): watchman on delegations abroad

Komittchik (literally, committee man): KGB operative

Kontra (literally, office): KGB First Main Directorate at Yasenevo

Krokst : counterintelligence operative, state security (OGPU)

Krsha (literally, roof): cover

Lstochnik (swallow): female operative employed for seduction

Les (the woods): KGB school, later the First Main Directorate at Yasenevo

Lzung : a crib for breaking open a cipher

Marshrtnyi agnt : employee of state security handling communications

Nevidmyi front (invisible front): secret intelligence

boroten (literally, shapeshifter): turncoat/traitor

Omsvets : operative in Cominterns department for international communications

Opr : abbreviation for either Operatvnyi sotrdnik/ofitsr or Operabtnik

Operabtnik : KGB operative

Operatvnyi sotrdnik / ofitsr : GRU operative

Opertkhnik : a technical operative

Operupolnomchennyi : one responsible for a particular operation

Osobsty : GRU officers

Osbye meropriytiya (special measures): assassination and other tasks approved only by the Politburo

Osbye zadchi (special tasks): assassination and other tasks approved only by the Politburo

Osvedomtel : information operative

Pe-ervets : political intelligence operative

Podkrshnik : operative under deep cover

Razvdupr ( Razvedyvatel noe upravlenie ): a generic term for military intelligence

Rezident : chief of a secret intelligence station

Rezidentura : secret intelligence station

Sapog (boots): KGB term for GRU counterparts

Sem (literally, removal): seizure of a traitor

Shifrogrmma : ciphered telegram

Svdba (literally, wedding): seizure of a traitor

Tsereshnik : CIA officer

Verbvshchik : operative specialising in recruitment

Vorn (raven): male operative employed for seduction

Zagrantchka : overseas post

The role of secret intelligence in the history of international relations has long been a neglected one. To the undaunted icebreakers in Britain and the United States who nevertheless forged ahead into these uncharted and inhospitable waters, we owe a debt of gratitude. Their drive for greater openness slowly yielded results on both sides of the Atlantic. Subsequent research on the history of the Western intelligence services has since been made possible by the greater freedom of information such sustained lobbying produced.

In the East, however, even the most optimistic held out no hope that access to similar information could ever be obtained. What did appear invariably originated with defectors from the KGB (such as Oleg Gordievsky) working with the Western intelligence services, and came on trust. Yet even when defectors offered as complete an overview of the KGB as they could manage, their knowledge inevitably fell short given the tight compartmentalisation of official secrets; filling in gaps of knowledge with rumour and guesswork only complicated matters further. And the KGB was not everything. It may have been the largest intelligence service in the world, but it was heavily weighted in favour of its domestic role, a role never played by its military counterpart, the GRU, the second-largest intelligence service in the world. The KGB without the GRU is thus only half the story. Yet there are no GRU memoirs of any consequence; certainly nothing comparable to those from the KGB.

As a result, thus far nothing comprehensive has been produced that takes in all the branches of Soviet intelligence: the KGB and the GRU, human intelligence and communications intelligence, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations. Since history is about perspective as well as information, the gaps in knowledge matter a great deal.

To be precise, the most detailed new revelations, notably two weighty volumes coauthored by Christopher Andrew and Lieutenant Colonel Vasili Mitrokhin, focus on the KGB and almost exclusively on the years of the Cold War (19471989). One of the KGBs erstwhile archivists, Mitrokhin had devoted more than a decade and, indeed, risked his life making detailed notes from the files of the First Main Directorate (foreign intelligence) as they were transferred from the Lubyanka, off Gorky Street, to the bright and shiny new headquarters at Yasenevo in the woods. In so doing, he smashed the dam of secrecy that had held firm over seven decades.

Without a doubt, the two books together represent a stunning achievement. They also caused a veritable sensation as Soviet agents, hitherto hidden, were exposed to the intrusive glare of uninvited publicity. Most but not all of these files have now been opened to public inspection at the Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge University. Their availability has unquestionably transformed our knowledge of the inner workings of the KGB in its foreign operations.

The undoubted strengths of Mitrokhins revelations notwithstanding, they are not entirely without problems: most important, the fact that the British government, which authorised release of the files, exercised its censorship over what has been made publicly available. Nine files on Britain and twenty-nine files on the United States (eight hundred pages of dense typescript) remain closed.

Doubtless as a result of restrictions on access imposed by the British, the Russians appear the sole initiators of operations. But are we really to assume that Moscow was alone in taking the initiative, whereas the West only reacted? We know from other operations in the Third World, for instance, that CIA and MI6 hardly sat on their hands. Yet the dirty linen hung out to dry is solely Russian. How can one write a balanced account of a long-standing conflict with more than half the sources deliberately removed?