Chad C. Serena - A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War

The US Army in the Iraq War

CHAD C. SERENA

Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. www.press.georgetown.edu 2011 by
Georgetown University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced
or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying
and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publisher.

The views expressed here are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views or
opinions of the RAND Corporation or its sponsors.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Serena, Chad C.

A revolution in military adaptation : the US Army in the Iraq War / Chad C. Serena.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-58901-783-2 (pbk. : acid-free paper)
1. United States. ArmyHistoryIraq War, 2003 2. United States. Army

Reorganization. 3. Strategic cultureUnited States. 4. Organizational change.
5. Organizational effectiveness. I. Title.
DS79.76.R484 2011
956.7044 340973dc22

2011003842

This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials.

15 14 13 12 11 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 First printing

Printed in the United States of America

CHAPTER ONE
Decisions in the PostCold War Period

CHAPTER TWO
The Transformation of the US Army

CHAPTER THREE
The Invasion of Iraq and Compelled Adaptation

CHAPTER FOUR
US Army Adaptation: Organizational Inputs

CHAPTER FIVE
US Army Adaptation: Organizational Outputs and Learning

CHAPTER SIX
The US Army and the Post-9/11 International Security Environment in Perspective

CHAPTER SEVEN
Moving Forward

As a first lieutenant and later captain, I served in the Information Operations Section of First Brigade Twenty-fifth Infantry Division, which shortly after my arrival transformed into the second of the armys Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT). I had the opportunity to modestly help in 1/25 SBCTs transformation process. Through this experience I learned quite a bit about how defense policy translates into organizational change. It was during this time that I first heard and became interested in the term and process of adaptation. Although I essentially understood the virtues of having adaptive organizations, leaders, and personnel, I never quite grasped how important adaptation could be to organizational survival and success until I watched from afar how events unfolded in Iraq.

Discussions with my wife, who deployed to Iraq with 3/2 SBCT from 2003 to 2004; friends; and colleagues, all veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom, inspired me to examine the armys processes of adaptation as an academic and to eventually write this book. At the outset of my analysis it was obvious that the operational environment and the insurgency in Iraq drove the armys adaptive efforts: Military organizations and personnel must always adapt when deployed. What remained largely unexplained was why the army had to adapt so radically to accomplish tactical, operational, and strategic goals against an enemy that, although much larger, was not intrinsically that much different from myriad threats that emerged in the postCold War period.

My intention in writing this book is to explain the armys adaptive process in detail and demonstrate that it was not only the operational environment and threat that influenced the armys adaptive efforts but also a series of successive postCold War policy decisions. These decisions, although not wholly inappropriate given the armys historical requirement of being prepared to win major conventional wars, did not properly account for strategic requirements, likely operational environments, and emerging threats. In successive combination, these decisions narrowed the armys capacity for adaptation while necessitating adaptation for strategic success. The army had to adapt not only to operational realities but also to its institutional design and processes, each shaped by postCold War policy decisions. This was particularly evident at the tactical level (the center of this books analysis of organizational adaptation), the level where policy intersects with reality on the ground and where military strategy is ultimately executed. Given the armys historical predilection and preparation for major combat operations, its successful adaptation for requirements in Iraq was a truly remarkable undertaking. This book assesses that process and its outcomes and concludes with recommendations to aid in capturing the adaptive capacity the army developed in Iraq.

This book is intended for policymakers, defense practitioners, and military personnel of all ranks. It should also prove of interest to military historians and academics who study or have an interest in the processes of organizational adaptation. The analysis in this book is built upon numerous interviews, a detailed examination of the evolution of doctrine and strategy, congressional testimonies, official histories, and scholarly writings on the subject of the armys experiences in Iraq.

I am grateful to a number of people for contributing to this study and for their unqualified support. At the University of Pittsburghs Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA), I am indebted to Phil Williams for his continued support and friendship from the inception of this study through its completion. His insight, stewardship, criticality, and availability helped me get through the challenges of putting this book together and bringing it to fruition. I am also thankful for the guidance from and friendship of Dennis Gormley, Donald Goldstein, and Michael Brenner. Without their insight and support, this work would not have been possible. Each of these gentlemens scholarship, companionship, and seemingly endless capacity for assistance is truly appreciated. I would also like to thank Beverly Brizzi, Renee Kidney, Joyce Valiquette, Tom Haase, Colin Clarke, Michael Echemendia, and Maj. C. Roy Beeson, US Army, for their friendship and helpfulness over the past few years.

At the US Army War College, I would like to thank Steven Metz in particular for his willingness to provide guidance to this work, availing his numerous connections and associations, and for being willing to help me at a moments notice. Steve is a true scholar, and I owe him a great debt of gratitude. I also benefited from lengthy conversations and interviews with Lt. Col. (ret.) Lenny Wong, US Army; Col. Richard Lacquement, US Army; and Col. Alex Crowther, US Army. Their comments and suggestions were invaluable. Lt. Col. (ret.) Conrad Crane, US Army, deserves special mention for his willingness to support this and other work that I have undertaken over the past few years.

I thank all of my attributed and unnamed interviewees from the US Army for their time and for their intellect, including Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, Gen. (ret.) William S. Wallace, Maj. Gen. David Perkins, Lt. Gen. Daniel Bolger, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Robert Scales, Brig. Gen. H. R. McMaster, Lt. Col. James Crider, and Lt. Col. (ret.) John Nagl. Not only did I stand on the shoulders of many giants prior to and during the preparation and writing of this book, I also had the opportunity to work with, interview, discuss, admire, and be humbled by many of them. Seeing through their eyes made my vision much clearer and my opinion of their adaptive struggle much greater.