David Sunderland - Communications in Africa, 1880 - 1939, Volume 3

BRITAIN AND AFRICA SERIES

COMMUNICATIONS IN AFRICA, 18801939

BRITAIN AND AFRICA SERIES

TITLES IN THIS SERIES

Economic Development of Africa, 18801939

David Sunderland (ed.)

FORTHCOMING TITLES

The Government and Administration of Africa, 18801939

Casper Andersen and Andrew Cohen (eds)

CONTENTS OF THE EDITION

VOLUME 1

General Introduction

Railways: Proposals

VOLUME 2

Railways: Construction

VOLUME 3

Railways: Operation

VOLUME 4

Railways: Operation and Economic Impact

VOLUME 5

Other Forms of Communication

Index

COMMUNICATIONS IN AFRICA, 18801939

GENERAL EDITOR
David Sunderland

ADVISORY EDITOR
Godfrey N. Uzoigwe

Volume 3
Railways: Operation

First published 2012 by Pickering & Chatto (Publishers) Limited

Published 2016 by Routledge

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Copyright Editorial material David Sunderland 2012

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BRITISH LIBRARY CATALOGUING IN PUBLICATION DATA

Communications in Africa, 18801939. (Britain and Africa)

1. Railroads Africa Planning Sources. 2. Railroads Africa Design and construction History 19th century Sources. 3. Railroads Africa Design and construction History 20th century Sources. 4. Railroads Africa Management History 20th century Sources. 5. Railroads Africa Economic aspects History 19th century Sources. 6. Railroads Africa Economic aspects History 20th century Sources. 7. Communication and traffic Africa History 19th century Sources. 8. Communication and traffic Africa History 20th century Sources. 9. Great Britain Colonies Africa Administration History 19th century Sources. 10. Great Britain Colonies Africa Administration History 20th century Sources.

I. Series II. Sunderland, David.

385.09609034-dc23

ISBN-13: 978-1-84893-064-3 (set)

Typeset by Pickering & Chatto (Publishers) Limited

The majority of British African railways were operated by local administrations. As discussed in the General Introduction in Volume 1, Rhodesian and early South African lines were built and operated by private companies, but were gradually acquired by the state (see Hammond, Report on the Railway System of Southern Rhodesia (1925), below; Smith, Special Railway Commissioner, upon the Administration, Organisation and Working of the Natal Government Railways (1903), below; and Herbert Frankel, Memorandum on Railway and Harbours Working and Finance (1933), below). In West Africa (see Hammond, Report on the Sierra Leone Government Railway (1922), below), Uganda, Kenya (apart from the KonzaMagadi railway) and Tanganyika (see Hammond, Report on the Railway Systems of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (1921), below, and Hammond, Report on the Railway System of Tanganyika Territory (1930), below) all the lines were publicly built and managed in West Africa by individual country authorities, and in Uganda and Kenya after the First World War, by the East African Railways Corporation.1 Proposals that government constructed lines be operated by the private sector were swiftly dismissed by both the Crown Agents and the Colonial Office. It was pointed out that contractor-run railways in the UK were poorly managed, that the absence of cost and revenue information would discourage contractors bidding for the management of railways and that those that did tender would submit excessively low offers that colonial officials would have difficulty judging. The local government would also be obliged to continue to bear its public responsibility as regards safety and would have to closely and expensively monitor operations to prevent the setting of excessive freight rates.2

Although they contributed greatly to economic development, the majority of lines were commercially unsuccessful.3 Losses were the result of both high costs and low revenues. Costs were raised by the basic nature of construction; in West Africa, by the poor quality of the lines built; various problems with expatriate and African labour; and inadequate organization of railway departments. The higher operating costs that arose from basic construction are summarized in Table 1; while a good example of a railway with high running costs caused by poor quality construction is the Gold Coast SekondiKumasi line. The steep gradients and tight curves of the railway restricted the haulage capacity of engines, badly laid track demanded almost continuous track maintenance and replacement, poorly built river crossings led to bridge speed limits, the failure to cut a wide right-of-way through forest increased the incident of falling trees that blocked and damaged track, and grades, curves and track problems resulted in numerous derailments and accidents.4

Table 1: The Impact of Lines of a Lower Standard on Operating Costs and Carrying Capacities.5

Costs were further increased by the appointment of advisory consulting engineers and expatriate staff. In order to ensure that completed lines worked efficiently and economically, their operation in the Crown colonies was initially supervised by consulting engineers, who provided advice on rates, staffing and management structures and track and equipment purchase and maintenance.6 For these duties, the West African consulting engineer, Frederic Shelford, received an annual salary plus expenses and recruitment and purchasing fees.7 Not surprisingly, Shelfords work was subject to a number of criticisms. It was argued that his remuneration was excessive, a claim supported by a comparison of consulting engineer/Crown Agent operation fees (see Table 2); in order to maximize his own income and avoid criticisms of the operation of lines, he recommended the purchase of expensive rolling stock and staff; and he failed to closely monitor the working of lines. He rarely visited Africa and his knowledge of railway operations was based on generally out-of-date reports and correspondence with general managers, who could easily omit information. More importantly, he insisted that completed lines be managed by highly remunerated general managers, selected by himself, and that colonial government involvement should be kept to a minimum, even when it was plain that railway departments were being inefficiently administered. Aware that Shelfords supervision of the operation of railways was as inadequate as his construction of them, the Crown Agents in 1904 sought to take over some of his duties, but were repulsed by the Colonial Office. A further attempt in 1911 was more successful, and, by the start of the First World War, they had acquired most of his workload.8