Derek Wood - The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain & the Rise of Air Power, 1930–1940

THE NARROW MARGIN

THE
NARROW
MARGIN

The Battle of Britain & the rise of air power 19301940

by
Derek Wood & Derek Dempster

First published in Great Britain in 1961 by Hutchinson & Company

Republished in this format in 2010 by
Pen & Sword Aviation
An imprint of
Pen & Sword Books Ltd
47 Church Street
Barnsley
South Yorkshire
S70 2AS

Copyright Derek Wood & Derek Dempster, 1961, 2003, 2010

ISBN 978 1848843 141

The right of Derek Wood & Derek Dempster to be identified as Author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

A CIP catalogue record for this book is
available from the British Library

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All the great struggles history have been won by superior will-power wresting victory in the teeth of odds or upon the narrowest of margins

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

Contents

Air Chief Marshal the Lord Dowding GCB GCVO CMG

This is undoubtedly the best account that I have read of the factual history of the Battle of Britain, and it is a pleasure for me to be able to say that I agree so much with the opinions that are expressed and the verdicts that have been reached. It was not until quite recently, after re-reading this excellent book, that I discovered that both the authors were too young to have been able to participate in the battle. They were, in fact, still at school during the time when it was fought. I must say that it is greatly to their credit that they have written about what happened with such understanding, basing it on the most meticulous research. That is particularly commendable when one realises that there was no way in which they could have been exposed to a first-hand contact with the problems and tensions faced by those who were actually involved in the battle. The authors have hit off most accurately the attitude that was mine, as the Commander-in-Chief of Fighter Command, at the time to say nothing of the others who participated in the battle and they have given a splendid accounting of the work of the pilots who were so deeply involved. This is a perceptive and moving book as well as being an excellent history of the events that led up to and the course that was followed by the battle in the summer of 1940.

In 1940 one of the most significant battles of history was fought in the skies over Britain. Its outcome had a profound effect on the future of the civilised world.

The Battle of Britain saved the country from invasion. If the R.A.F. had been defeated all the efforts of the Army and Navy could hardly have averted defeat in the face of complete German air superiority. With all Europe subjugated, Germany and Japan would later have met on the borders of India.

The undivided weight of the German war effort would then have fallen on Russia with the United States completely isolated.

It is unlikely that there will ever be a parallel to the Battle of Britain where armies and navies, immobilised on either side of the Channel, watched a few thousand combatants meet in the air above.

The battle was not, however, won in the period from July to October 1940 alone. The outcome was the culmination of the preparation, good judgment and error made in the preceding seven years.

On the face of it the Luftwaffe should have won the battle. It possessed superiority in numbers and bases stretching round two-thirds of Britain, but lacked any effective plan of campaign, intelligence facilities and above all operational scientific knowledge.

The battle marked the advent of controlled scientific warfare, which is the basis of defence strategy today. Science and enlightenment were employed in the British and not the German camp.

We have endeavoured to show, step by step, how the military machines of both sides were built up and how they finally came to grips in the summer of 1940. The battle has been laid out for the first time in the form of a complete operational day-to-day diary.

Most previous accounts of the battle have been divided into four phases, but close analysis of official records reveals a clear cut separation for the R.A.F. into five phases between July 11th and October 30th. The diary has accordingly been divided in this form.

German historians still persist in regarding the Luftkrieg gegen England (air war against England) as one continuous battle from the summer of 1940 up to May 1941. Their own records refute this assertion. The beginning of all-out night blitz in November 1940 and the fading out of day bombing marked the end of a complete chapter in the air war. Invasion was no longer possible and direct assault on the R.A.F. and southern England gave way to a war against industry, the shipping lifelines and morale.

We have therefore ended the narrative in October, by which time Hitler had cancelled operation Seelwe and already turned his eyes to the east.

The appendices have been made as comprehensive as possible to avoid the use of lengthy footnotes and cross-references. Original official British and German designations and nomenclature have been used except in one case where the prefix Me is given for the Messerschmitt Company. The abbreviation Me was not officially used until 1944 and Messerschmitt fighters were known by the letters Bf (Bayerische Fleugzeugwerke).

So many official German sources adopted the prefix Me in 1940 that it became a generic term in the Luftwaffe and the R.A.F. We have therefore used it to avoid confusion.

Throughout, the losses quoted for both sides are the official figures and not estimates. Suggestions have been made from time to time that the Luftwaffe casualty figures put out by the Air Ministry after the war were based on original records which were falsified for German propaganda purposes. Close examination of these records has shown that they are completely accurate. Losses were laid down in great detail in the Luftwaffe Quartermaster Generals returns for the period, and these were used as a basis for the replacement of aircraft and crews for pensions and administrative purposes. It is impossible to imagine any commander deliberately understating his casualties and thus losing the fresh aircraft and personnel he so vitally needed.

A military history which casts a net as wide as The Narrow Margin cannot be written without the help and goodwill of those who witnessed the events described. In the two years it took to write the book the paths of inquiry have led us to many people in Britain and the Continent of Europe to whom we should like to record our gratitude.