• Complain

Prajit K. Dutta - Strategies and games: theory and practice

Here you can read online Prajit K. Dutta - Strategies and games: theory and practice full text of the book (entire story) in english for free. Download pdf and epub, get meaning, cover and reviews about this ebook. year: 1999, publisher: MIT Press, genre: Business. Description of the work, (preface) as well as reviews are available. Best literature library LitArk.com created for fans of good reading and offers a wide selection of genres:

Romance novel Science fiction Adventure Detective Science History Home and family Prose Art Politics Computer Non-fiction Religion Business Children Humor

Choose a favorite category and find really read worthwhile books. Enjoy immersion in the world of imagination, feel the emotions of the characters or learn something new for yourself, make an fascinating discovery.

Prajit K. Dutta Strategies and games: theory and practice
  • Book:
    Strategies and games: theory and practice
  • Author:
  • Publisher:
    MIT Press
  • Genre:
  • Year:
    1999
  • Rating:
    3 / 5
  • Favourites:
    Add to favourites
  • Your mark:
    • 60
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
    • 4
    • 5

Strategies and games: theory and practice: summary, description and annotation

We offer to read an annotation, description, summary or preface (depends on what the author of the book "Strategies and games: theory and practice" wrote himself). If you haven't found the necessary information about the book — write in the comments, we will try to find it.

Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law. Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Duttas experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University.The book is divided into three parts: Strategic Form Games and Their Applications, Extensive Form Games and Their Applications, and Asymmetric Information Games and Their Applications. The theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated games, dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, and signaling. An appendix presents a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, as well as the optimization and probability theory required for the course.Every chapter that introduces a new theoretical concept opens with examples and ends with a case study. Case studies include Global Warming and the Internet, Poison Pills, Treasury Bill Auctions, and Final Jeopardy. Each part of the book also contains several chapter-length applications including Bankruptcy Law, the NASDAQ market, OPEC, and the Commons problem. This is also the first text to provide a detailed analysis of dynamic strategic interaction.

Prajit K. Dutta: author's other books


Who wrote Strategies and games: theory and practice? Find out the surname, the name of the author of the book and a list of all author's works by series.

Strategies and games: theory and practice — read online for free the complete book (whole text) full work

Below is the text of the book, divided by pages. System saving the place of the last page read, allows you to conveniently read the book "Strategies and games: theory and practice" online for free, without having to search again every time where you left off. Put a bookmark, and you can go to the page where you finished reading at any time.

Light

Font size:

Reset

Interval:

Bookmark:

Make
page_1
Page 1
PART ONE
INTRODUCTION
page_1
page_10
Page 10
Picture 1Picture 2
CONCEPT CHECK
ANALYSIS OF MARIENBAD
We claim that: If the two piles are balanced with one match in each pile, player 1 has a winning strategy. On the other hand, if the two piles are balanced, with at least two matches in each pile, player 2 has a winning strategy. Finally, if the two piles are unbalanced, player I has a winning strategy. Try proving these claims.15
Note, incidentally, that in both of these games the first player to move (referred to in my discussion as player 1) has an advantage if the piles are unbalanced, but not otherwise.
2. Voting.
This example is an idealized version of committee voting. It is meant to illustrate the advantages of strategic voting, in other words, a manner of voting in which a voter thinks through what the other voters are likely to do rather than voting simply according to his preferences.
Suppose that there are two competing bills, designated here as A and B, and three legislators, voters 1, 2 and 3, who vote on the passage of these bills. Either of two outcomes are possible: either A or B gets passed, or the legislators choose to pass neither bill (and stay with the status quo law instead). The voting proceeds as follows: first, bill A is pitted against bill B; the winner of that contest is then pitted against the status quo which, for simplicity, we will call "neither"(or N). In each of the two rounds of voting, the bill that the majority of voters cast their vote for, wins. The three legislators have the following preferences among the available options.
voter 1: Picture 3
voter 2: Picture 4
voter 3: Picture 5
(where Picture 6 should be read as, "Bill A is preferred to bill B.")
Analysis.
Note that if the voters voted according to their preferences (i.e., truthfully) then A would win against B and then, in round two, would also win against N. However, voter 3 would be very unhappy with this state of affairs; she most prefers N and can in fact enforce that outcome by simply switching her first round vote to B, which would then lose to N. Is that the outcome? Well, since we got started we might wish to then note that, acknowledging this possibility, voter 2 can also switch her vote and get A elected (which is preferable to N for this voter).
There is a way to proceed more systematically with the strategic analysis. To begin with, notice that in the second round each voter might as well vote truthfully. This is because by voting for a less preferred option, a legislator might get that passed. That would be clearly worse than blocking its passage. Therefore, if A wins in the first round, the eventual outcome will be A, whereas if B wins, the eventual outcome will be N. Every
Picture 7Picture 8
15Again you may prefer to work step by step through these questions in the Exercises section.
Picture 9Picture 10
16This example may also be found in Fun and Games by Ken Binmore (D.C. Heath).
page_10
page_100
Page 100
4. The tragedy of the commons is exacerbated in large populations.
5. There are many real-world illustrations of the tragedy of the commons; the historical extinction of the American buffalo and the current possibility of global warming are two such examples.
6. Various solutions have been proposed to avert a tragedy. They include privatization, taxes or user fees, and limits to accessibility.
Exercises
Section 7.1
7.1
Give an example of a resource, natural or otherwise, to which there is not common access, that is, a resource that only selected people can use.
7.2
Give an example of a resource, natural or otherwise, that is not depletable, that is, a resource that does not deplete in quantity (for all practical purposes) when more people use the resource.
7.3
Is there a tragedy of the commons in either of your examples? Does a resource have to be commonly accessible and depletable for it to be overused?
7.4
Are the resources devoted to public education an example of a common property resource? Explain.
7.5
From your daily life can you think of a tragedy of the commons phenomenon? Explain your answer.
Section 7.2
(Calculus problem) The resource that we analyzed in the text is an exhaustible resource. To see that the phenomenon of the tragedy of the commons can also arise if the resource
page_100
page_101
Page 101
is renewable, consider the following variant of the model in the text. Each player extracts an amount ci in the first period, i = 1, 2. Whatever is not extracted, that is, the amount y - c - c , regenerates and becomes an amount equal to Picture 11 in period 2. The rest of the model will be identical to that in the text; in particular, the utility function will be log c, and the allocation rule (if the total desired is more than what is available) will be to give half to each player.
7.6
Write down the best response problem for player 1.
7.7
Show that the best response function is given by
Next page
Light

Font size:

Reset

Interval:

Bookmark:

Make

Similar books «Strategies and games: theory and practice»

Look at similar books to Strategies and games: theory and practice. We have selected literature similar in name and meaning in the hope of providing readers with more options to find new, interesting, not yet read works.


Reviews about «Strategies and games: theory and practice»

Discussion, reviews of the book Strategies and games: theory and practice and just readers' own opinions. Leave your comments, write what you think about the work, its meaning or the main characters. Specify what exactly you liked and what you didn't like, and why you think so.