Anderson - The forgotten front : the East African campaign 1914-1918

As Europe slid towards war in July 1914, life in colonial East Africa continued at its normal pace. Senior officials and military officers were aware of the increasingly disturbing news, but for the vast majority of the population there was little expectation that conflict would come to them. Few of the white settlers or officials had any great enthusiasm for fighting their neighbours, while the African population was largely unaware of this remote quarrel between Europeans. In German East Africa, the authorities were preparing for a major exhibition to celebrate the achievements of the past twenty years. Certainly, East Africa seemed an unlikely place for hostilities between the rival empires. European rule dated back less than thirty years and, despite a steady influx of settlers, the overwhelming majority of the population remained African. By 1914, the population of German East Africa was over 7.5 million Africans, 14,000 Indians and over 5,300 Europeans, as compared to the nearly 7 million Africans, 28,000 Indians and 6,000 Europeans in British East Africa and Uganda. The proportions were similar in the surrounding territories of the Belgian Congo, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Portuguese East Africa.

Whether colonies, protectorates or chartered territories, they were all notable for their sheer size and lack of development. German East Africa was nearly twice the size of metropolitan Germany, measuring some 1,100 km north to south and 960 km east to west. Its terrain and climate varied tremendously, ranging from arid steppes to humid jungles and rugged mountains. Roads were very few and the main means of transportation was by the two railways, the Usambara Railway in the north and the Central Railway in the centre of the colony. They had been built in an attempt to stimulate economic development, but revenues were still very limited in relation to the cost of building. To the north British East Africa was equally varied, with its economic lifeline being the Uganda Railway that ran from Mombasa to Lake Victoria. In the west, the Belgian Congo was an enormous expanse of tropical forest and river, where movement was slow and difficult. Further south, British Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were notable for vast areas and poor communications, while the northern part of Portuguese East Africa was virtually untouched by Europeans. The region offered considerable potential, but in 1914 it had little economic or military value. As a consistent drain on the respective imperial exchequers, it was hardly a rich prize. But, whatever its value, East Africa was inextricably drawn into war, with few imagining the scope of the fighting that would bring unprecedented devastation.

East Africas lack of economic strength was reflected in the weakness of its military power. With varying degrees of enthusiasm, European governments had tried to develop their territories through agriculture, trade and settlement. Faced by persistent budget shortfalls and constant demands for spending, they kept military expenditure to the minimum necessary to maintain European supremacy. Power was exerted through a combination of locally raised military units and paramilitary police, all commanded by whites. These were expected to keep law and order, but colonial governments were quite prepared to use force to control the African population. Punitive expeditions against recalcitrant tribes were common, especially on the frontier, although methods often varied.

In the opening months of the war, there was considerable criticism about the apparent lack of military preparation or planning. This was not actually the case for either Britain or Germany. The former, as the leading imperial and naval power, had put considerable thought into the problems of colonial defence. The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) had carried out a series of detailed surveys and draft schemes of defence. These ranged from the general principles, to details as to the position of regular army officers seconded to local defence forces, to the defence of cable communications.

Sea power was fundamental to British imperial defence. The Royal Navy was the means by which the security of overseas territories and trade would be secured. The power of the fleet was augmented by a worldwide system of undersea telegraph cables, all landing in friendly territory, which provided unparalleled and secure communications. With this combination of naval strength and centralised decision-making, the British Admiralty expected to gain mastery of the ocean lines quickly in order to maintain the uninterrupted flow of shipping and trade. It accepted that in the early stages of a conflict, an enemy might find it possible to gain local superiority in distant waters and threaten overseas possessions. But ultimate victory would accrue to the greater naval power and the fate of the African, or any, colonies would depend on this rather than local military operations.

This meant that colonial defence policy was directed to the prevention and suppression of African uprisings and such forces were specifically not intended to match the strengths of the forces in neighbouring colonies. Based on these assumptions, the defence of British East Africa and its all-important Uganda Railway had been considered in detail and a comprehensive defence plan had been drafted and updated by 1912. Reflecting the political circumstances of the day, it focused on the potential threat from German East Africa. It was based on the latest, and quite accurate, intelligence estimates of German military strength as well as the terrain and likely enemy approaches. Particular detail was devoted to the importance and vulnerability of the Uganda Railway although it also took into account the difficulties of movement and the dispersed nature of the potential enemy forces. It recognised that with the Kings African Rifles (KAR) focused on tribal operations in the far north of the protectorate, they would need up to two weeks to redeploy to the south. But the more dispersed German Schutztruppe (Protective Force) would take much longer to move north, giving sufficient time to parry any invasion. The plan was underpinned by recognition of the fundamental importance of the Royal Navys obtaining ultimate supremacy.

Germany had rather different conceptions of colonial defence, owing largely to its status as a land power in Europe. As a relative newcomer to overseas imperialism, its empire was widely spread and vulnerable. Despite the naval arms race, the German Admiralty realised that it could never compete with the British outside European waters. Consequently, it adopted a strategy known as Kreuzerkrieg (cruiser warfare) which would attack British shipping at its weakest points. This meant that the cruisers and armed auxiliaries stationed abroad would put to sea as soon as hostilities threatened and would patrol their secret war stations with orders to attack isolated merchant vessels. They would avoid enemy squadrons and concentrate on the shipping lanes that maintained Britains wealth and power. While aggressive, it was also a policy of weakness that implicitly acknowledged that colonial possessions would be left to their own defences. For Germany, victory on land would determine the fate of the colonies.

Bereft of naval protection, German East Africas first line of defence was diplomatic, for it lay within the area described by the Berlin Act of 1885 that attempted to regulate responsibilities and rights in the exploitation of the Congo Basin. Critically, the Act permitted the neutralisation of that area in time of a general European war under certain conditions. Chapter III, Article 10 stated that each of the ruling powers had the option of declaring their part of the Congo Basin neutral so long as: the Powers which exercise or shall exercise the rights of sovereignty or protectorate over those territories, using their option of proclaiming themselves neutral, shall fulfil the duties which neutrality requires.