Tincey - Marlboroughs First Victory

In 1984 David Baz Ryan established the Partizan Press and published his well-received book Scots Armies of the English Civil War by Stuart Reid. I pointed out that 1985 was the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Sedgemoor, and that there might be a market for a book about the battle. The response was when will you have it ready? and I became an author, largely by accident.

When in 2003 Pen and Sword asked if I had research that might form the basis of a new book, I decided to return to the Monmouth Rebellion. Very little had been published on Sedgemoor after the flurry of books which greeted the 1985 celebrations and I thought that a book concentrating on the military campaign might be of interest. It quickly became apparent that John Churchill, later the Duke of Marlborough, should be the focus of my project.

Having maintained an interest in Sedgemoor during the intervening twenty years, I had no doubt of the conclusions to which my researches would lead me. Monmouth had proved a poor and irresolute commander. Churchill, although highly competent, had shown no special brilliance during the campaign or battle. The Earl of Feversham had been unfairly vilified by claims of inefficiency and lethargy in attending the battle, the result of bigotry against a general of French origins. The original proposal for this book suggested the title Sedgemoor, Marlboroughs first command , reflecting these beliefs.

As the work progressed I became aware that the events that I was relating did not quite fit with my preconceptions. Monmouth emerged as a talented commander who made the best of the limited resources available to him. Churchills professionalism became more marked in comparison to those around him. Most strikingly of all, Fevershams handling of the campaign appeared lacking in determination and purpose.

The battle of Sedgemoor was not the straightforward matter described by the Royalist contemporary accounts. Many events that were said to have happened within a short space of time had clearly not done so. The authors of the narratives had flattered the victorious general by recording only his good decisions. But was there more to it? My doubts might have come to nothing, but towards the end of 2003 I bought the newly published book Two Men in a Trench II by Dr Tony Pollard and Neil Oliver. The book gave details of archaeological work undertaken for a BBC TV programme. The account of the excavations at Sedgemoor proved interesting. In an area called Kings Field, a small metal-detecting survey had discovered a significant amount of musket and pistol shot around the old course of the Bussex Rhine. This was a puzzling discovery, for all the contemporary accounts agreed that the battle had been fought on the extreme right of the Royal line and Kings Field was on the extreme left.

I had expected my researches to support the accepted view of the campaign and battle, but here was evidence of fighting where all the sources said nothing had happened. After following some false leads I obtained from the British Library a copy of a letter written by the Rector of Chedzoy, Andrew Paschall. Described there were events which the Rector had wisely omitted from his two widely-circulated accounts of the campaign and battle. In July 1686 King James was about to make a tour of the battlefield. Paschall did not dare to include in his narrative what he had learned of the tragic mistakes made by the Royal cavalry that led to them being fired on by their own men, or of the cowardice displayed by one high in the Royal army. For 300 years Paschalls letter has been overlooked or misinterpreted and for 300 years a cover-up, which stretched upward to King James himself, went unchallenged.