David Smith - Sherman’s March to the Sea 1864: Atlanta to Savannah

T he year 1864 had once held great hope for the Confederacy. The chances of achieving a total military victory may have been slim, but there were other factors working in favor of the rebels. War-weariness in the North was increasing as casualties mounted and a presidential election was looming in November. There was a real chance that the Democrats might wrest power from Abraham Lincoln, and that in turn might mean a negotiated settlement to end the war.

One of Lincolns former generals-in-chief, George Brinton McClellan, would run for the Democrats on a so-called peace platform, while stories of savage fighting and terrible casualty lists made their way from the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and the Siege of Petersburg to the pages of the Northern newspapers. Ulysses S. Grant, by now lieutenant general and general-in-chief, had hoped to win the war by the end of May, but as the eastern theater settled into a trench-bound stalemate, attention switched to William Tecumseh Sherman in the West.

Shermans campaign against Joseph E. Johnstons rugged Army of Tennessee was a cat-and-mouse affair that saw clever maneuvering on the part of Sherman pitted against the careful defensive strategy of Johnston. Atlanta was Shermans goal, and for a while it seemed Johnston would hold the Union forces at bay long enough to deny Sherman the sort of headlining victory that could reinvigorate the Northern war effort and save Lincoln. That all changed in July, when an exasperated Jefferson Davis, convinced that Johnston would eventually give up Atlanta without a fight, replaced him with the impetuous corps commander John Bell Hood. Hood almost immediately attacked, but was beaten at Peach Tree Creek, Ezra Church, and Jonesborough. On September 1, Hood was forced to evacuate Atlanta. Atlanta is ours, Sherman wired Lincoln, and fairly won. Any talk of a negotiated peace was now unthinkable and Lincolns re-election was a certainty.

Ever-growing casualty lists contributed to a mood of war-weariness in the North by the summer of 1864. A dead Union soldier at Petersburg, and a Confederate counterpart, bear silent testimony to the spiraling cost of the war and with no end in sight, defeat for Lincoln in Novembers election was a real possibility. (LOC, LC-B811-3181)

Lincoln was opposed in the 1864 election by his former general-in-chief, George Brinton McClellan, the political opponents photographed together here at the Battle of Antietam, 1862. (LOC, LC-B817-7948)

Sherman was already making plans for his next move, and it was to be daring in the extreme. His anger at the South for starting the conflict revealed itself in a cold determination to make the people themselves experience war. He would force the civilian population to leave Atlanta, destroy everything of military value in the city, and then set out with his army on a march through Georgia, aiming for the coast, with the intention of destroying the states war-making capability.

The plan was calculated and deliberate, but it was the end that interested Sherman, not the means. Removing Georgia from the rebellion might effectively be achieved by marching an army of 60,000 men right through it, but it might also be achieved by more subtle methods. Sherman made a bold offer to Governor Joseph Brown. If the governor withdrew Georgia from the rebellion, then Shermans men would spare the State, and in our passage across it confine the troops to the main roads, and would, moreover, pay for all the corn and food we needed. If not, he would be compelled to go ahead, devastating the State in its whole length and breadth.

Sherman had not yet, however, received permission to embark on his bold march. There were many who considered a movement through hostile territory to be inviting disaster. Surely the Southern people would rise up and snipe at Shermans isolated army at every opportunity, destroying foodstuffs, burning bridges, and whittling his men down until his army was entirely destroyed. Such apocalyptic visions were not uncommon, and even Lincoln and Grant were concerned. There was also the matter of Hoods army, situated around Lovejoys Station and still a threat, especially given the unpredictable nature of the commanding general. With 40,000 Confederates dogging Shermans every step, the march might indeed become a nightmare for the Union general.

Confederate defenses around Atlanta may have proved difficult to crack, but Joseph E. Johnstons reluctance to attack the advancing Union armies under William Tecumseh Sherman would cost him his command. (LOC, LC-B811-2722)

With Atlanta safely in his grasp, Sherman turned his thoughts to the next stage of his campaign, but his plans to march his army through Georgia would not be well received by his superiors. (LOC, LC-B811-3626)

Events took an unexpected turn when, on September 21, Hood moved his army westward, to Palmetto, thus, as Sherman saw it himself, stepping aside and opening wide the door for us to enter Central Georgia. Sherman correctly assumed that Hoods intention was to attack the Union supply line the railroad leading to Atlanta. It was an imaginative move from Hood, putting his army on the offensive after months of retreat and defeat and taking the initiative from Sherman. With his own ideas not fully worked out and with no authorization from above, Sherman felt unable to ignore Hoods move. If I felt sure that Savannah would soon be in our possession, he wrote to General Henry W. Halleck, Grants chief of staff, I should be tempted to march for Milledgeville and Augusta; but I must first secure what I have.